



The Chinese Navy

Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles



EDITED BY

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*Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung,
Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang*



PUBLISHED BY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS FOR THE
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
2011

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Chapter 5 was originally published as an article of the same title in *Asian Security* 5, no. 2 (2009), 144–169. Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Used by permission.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Chinese Navy : expanding capabilities, evolving roles / edited by Phillip C. Saunders ... [et al].
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. China. Zhongguo ren min jie fang jun. Hai jun. 2. Sea-power--China. 3. Naval art and science--China. 4. China--Military policy. I. Saunders, Phillip C. (Phillip Charles), 1966-

VA633.C57 2011

359.00951--dc23

2011020795

First printing, December 2011

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512-1800 or write to the: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. For the U.S. Government Online Bookstore, go to: <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>

For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, consult the National Defense University Web site at: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss>

The editors respectfully dedicate this volume to the memory of Ellis Joffe, who attended and contributed to many of the Chinese Council on Advanced Policy Studies/RAND conferences, including the one that formed the basis for this book. His many contributions as a scholar, colleague, mentor, and friend are sorely missed.

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Chapter 3

Beyond the Moat: The PLAN's Evolving Interests and Potential Influence

M. Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman

As China's economy grows and national interests expand, how do the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in general, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) in particular, see their roles and responsibilities changing? In addition, how might the PLAN exert influence in debates over national policy? In this paper, we find evidence of both change and continuity in the PLAN's sense of its missions at sea and areas in the future where it may shape Chinese policies beyond the domain of naval affairs, such as the interpretation of international maritime law. On the one hand, longstanding interests such as the prevention by force of Taiwan's *de jure* independence, the defense of China's eastern coast, and the preservation of China's claims to sovereignty over islands in the South China and East China Seas, remain crucially important. However, we also show that issues related to China's economy, namely, maintaining the conditions for continued growth and protecting China's links to the international economy, are growing in salience. Increasingly, the PLAN is casting itself as the protector of China's economy, and using that as a selling point for increasing the navy's budget.

New understandings of China's national interests are reflected in changing definitions of *haiyang quanyi* (海洋权益), commonly abbreviated to *haiquan*, (海权), or China's "maritime rights and interests." This term has been in use since at least the 1980s, and while there is no consensus on its precise meaning, there is no question that its scope has dramatically expanded. In a 2000 issue of *Modern Navy*, staff writer Niu Baocheng (牛宝成) laid out three conceptions of *haiquan*, arguing that "as human society develops, and especially as our understanding of the oceans increases, the meaning and implications of *haiquan* are also continuously changing."¹ In the past, Niu argues, China has held a narrow view of *haiquan*, including only the protection of the coast and coastal waters, China's contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Today, China holds a broader definition of *haiquan* that includes the ability to travel through international waters and the capability to develop resources at sea. Eventually, Niu argues, China must move toward what he calls "military maritime rights and interests" (*junshi haiquan*, 军事海权), referring to the ability of military

Authors' Note: The research for this paper was completed in 2007 and does not use more recent materials.

vessels to move freely through the oceans and protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the event of war, as well as the ability to prevent the enemy from having similar freedom. While Niu's argument should not be taken to represent the official view of the PLAN, his article does make explicit what is implicit in much writing in military journals and newspapers: that China's interests are expanding and the PLAN must prepare to protect these interests.

... Two If by Sea

While the PLAN's concept of *haiquan* has grown to include economic interests, the concept of *haifang* (海防), or "maritime defense," is also evolving. For at least 20 years, naval authors have routinely noted that since 1840, the main threats to China's security have come from the ocean.² For this reason PLAN authors have long tried to change the "emphasize land, ignore the sea" (*zhonglu qinghai*, 重陆轻海) thinking within the military. Starting in the mid 1990s, however, naval authors have gone further. It is not enough just to emphasize naval defense, they argue; instead, the conception of what maritime defense means should be expanded. China must stop seeing its oceans merely as a "moat" (*huchenghe*, 护城河) that protects China's landmass, and instead realize that the oceans themselves hold vital interests that must be defended. These interests include 300 million square kilometers of "blue territory" (*lanse guotu*, 蓝色国土)—China's claimed area of maritime sovereignty), three main groups of disputed islands and reefs, an exclusive economic zone rich in natural resources, and shipping lanes which supply China with energy and resources and connect it to the international economy.

Overall, we find a growing emphasis in naval sources casting the PLAN as the protector of China's economy. In many cases this is directly connected to naval appeals for more military resources, and even to arguments that the proportion of the military budget spent on the navy should be increased. While the prevention of Taiwan's independence remains a mainstay in PLAN arguments for funding, newer and subtler arguments are being made that portray spending on the navy as a sound investment in China's economy. Specifically, the PLAN is trying to shape policy debates over offshore islands, the interpretation of maritime law, energy security, and how to secure sea lanes.

This paper explores these changing conceptions of the PLAN's role and its potential influence by adopting an "inside-out" approach. We first consider those areas which China considers its own territory—Taiwan and the disputed islands in the South and East China Seas. Second, we examine evolving views of China's EEZ and potential exploitation of its natural resources. Finally, we move farthest away from China's coast and look at attitudes

toward protecting shipping lanes, the “Malacca Dilemma,” and the security of China’s energy imports from the Middle East. Our primary goal is to lay out the PLAN/PLA viewpoint on each issue, and to illuminate the military’s point of view in comparison to civilian views on the same topic to determine how the PLAN might be a factor in national policymaking. Second, where possible, we have also looked for evidence of differences in position between the PLAN and the PLA, although this is substantially more challenging.

Research Design

The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which the PLAN is an *influential actor*, which is defined as possessing an ability to shape or influence national policy goals and priorities beyond the arena of naval affairs. This is a daunting analytical task, given the paucity of reliable data and the general secrecy that surrounds national security decisionmaking in China. Often, only the outcome of the policymaking process can be observed; thus we focus on how the PLAN articulates its interests in areas where it might readily influence national policy and examine how the PLAN’s articulation of its interests in these areas has changed over time. Space-permitting, we then compare PLAN or PLA sources on maritime affairs to relevant civilian sources to identify similarities or differences in conceptions of China’s national interest in the same issue.

Recent PLAN and PLA writings on “maritime defense” (*haifang*) and “maritime rights and interests” (*haiyang quanyi* or *haiquan*) outline a set of national policy issues where the PLAN influence might be most easily observed. These issues are as follows: sovereignty disputes over offshore islands as well as Taiwan; the assertion and defense of maritime rights under international law, especially rights to offshore resources within China’s EEZ; and the security of sea lanes and freedom of navigation on the high seas. The PLAN has a clear organizational interest in promoting these issues, as each has an unambiguous role for the navy and can be framed as a rationale for increased budgetary resources and operational missions beyond coastal defense (*jin’an fangyu*). While these rationales are important, the PLAN’s potential for influence over national policy can be inferred in several ways. First, PLAN or other PLA sources may place a different emphasis than government sources on the same issue, which would suggest policies that the PLAN might seek to shape or alter. Second, in their writings, PLAN or PLA officers may advocate for specific changes in national policy, which might suggest one fault line in internal debate over a given issue and highlight an area where the PLAN could exert influence.

In this paper, we use several methods to tackle these issues. First, we compare the frequency of articles on key topics in the PLA’s leading newspaper,

the *PLA Daily* (*Jiefangjun Bao*), and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) main newspaper, the *People's Daily* (*Renmin Ribao*). Depending on the specific topic, we count either the number of articles with the keyword in the title or the number of articles in which the keyword appears in the full text of the article. As the *PLA Daily* electronic archive is available from 1987 to 2005, almost two decades of newspaper articles can be examined. Although the *People's Daily* is a CCP newspaper and not a government source, the close links between the party and the government suggest that it is a useful proxy for civilian viewpoints. By comparing the frequency of issues discussed in these two sources, we can draw a rough baseline for potential differences between the military and the civilian government. As the *PLA Daily* is the PLA's newspaper, the results must be interpreted as reflecting the naval or maritime issues deemed important or newsworthy by the PLA as a whole, not just the PLAN. Nevertheless, if the number of articles on a given maritime issue is increasing in one paper and decreasing in the other, one could reasonably infer a change in the importance of the issue for the military or the government. Even if the yearly frequency is roughly the same, the magnitude of articles in each paper may also reveal information about the relative importance of different issues for the PLAN and the government.

Second, we examine both the frequency and content of relevant articles in military publications, especially journals and magazines. The most important magazines for this study are *Modern Navy* (*Dangdai Haijun*) and *National Defense* (*Guofang*). *Modern Navy* is especially important, as it is published by the PLAN's party committee (*dangwei*) and can be used to "take the temperature" of China's navy and its corporate interests. One limitation of these sources, however, is that many articles are penned by cadre in the Political Warfare Department, not by military or naval strategists. In addition, the authoritativeness of magazine articles can be questioned when the author's institution or military rank is not listed. We also consult other military sources on naval issues, including, for example, the relevant sections of the last two editions of *Zhanyi Xue* (*The Science of Campaigns*) as well as articles in *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* (*China Military Science*).

Maritime Sovereignty Disputes: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea

Almost all analyses of maritime security published by PLAN or PLA sources stress the prominence of sovereignty disputes over contested offshore islands, especially given the resolution of the majority of China's territorial disputes on its land border. As a result, if the PLAN exerts influence over

national policy, it perhaps should be most easily observed in discussion of disputes over offshore islands. In addition to sovereignty, the islands are seen as key to the assertion of maritime rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as important for the security of adjacent SLOCs. Thus, analysis of how the PLA and PLAN portray China's interests in these disputes cannot be separated from the following two sections of this paper.

The analysis of PLAN and other PLA writings on maritime sovereignty disputes highlights several trends. First, the dispute over Taiwan receives more attention than China's other offshore island disputes. Moreover, attention to the Taiwan dispute in PLA sources has increased markedly since 2000. Second, although China's other maritime sovereignty disputes are portrayed as "more prominent" than before, discussion of these disputes appears not to be increasing and by some measures actually declining. Third, interestingly, the PLA has focused more attention on those disputes where China maintains a strong position in relative terms, publishing significantly more articles on the Spratlys (where it occupies seven reefs) compared to the Senkakus (where it holds none of the features that it claims). Fourth, the content of PLA and PLAN writings on these disputes focuses on maintaining and consolidating claims as well as providing a rationale for "maritime defense construction" (*haifang jianshe*). Little evidence exists to suggest an active effort to shape policy in the offshore island disputes, though continued affirmation of China's sovereignty claims suggests that the PLA would oppose substantial compromises in any future negotiations with the other claimants.

Taiwan

A brief analysis of PLAN and PLA discussions of Taiwan provides a useful context for assessing the relative importance of China's maritime sovereignty disputes. A search of articles in the *PLA Daily* and the *People's Daily* that contain "tai" (台) in the title and "taidu" (Taiwan independence, 台独) in the full-text reveals several trends.³ As shown in figure 3-1, the frequency of articles on the Taiwan dispute in both newspapers has increased steadily since 1987. In particular, the number of articles reached an inflection point in 2000, the year when Chen Shui-bian was elected president of Taiwan. Likewise, as shown in figure 3-2, Taiwan receives substantially more coverage in the *PLA Daily* than do other territorial disputes with a maritime component. Finally, as shown in figure 3-3, the number of articles in *Modern Navy* that contain "Taiwan" in the full text reflects a steady increase in coverage, while reporting on China's other maritime territorial disputes has not increased.

Figure 3-1. The Taiwan Dispute in Core Newspapers (Title Search)






Figure 3-2. Maritime Sovereignty Disputes in *PLA Daily* (Title Search)



Note: The Taiwan search used "tai" in the title and "tai-du" in the full text.

Figure 3–3. Maritime Sovereignty Disputes in *Modern Navy* (Full-text Search)

These results, of course, are not surprising. Taiwan is a key issue for China's military and provides a clear rationale for force modernization, including naval modernization. Given the sheer volume of Taiwan-related articles in military sources, PLAN or PLA influence—or potential influence—over China's Taiwan policy is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, for our purposes, two trends should be noted. First, in absolute terms, the *People's Daily* has published more articles on Taiwan in the search described above than the *PLA Daily*. Moreover, the *PLA Daily* appears to publish little original content on Taiwan, as most articles appear to be sourced from Xinhua and not “*benbao*” (本报) reporting. In the Taiwan dispute, then, the *PLA Daily* fulfills its mission to communicate CCP policies throughout China's armed forces. At the same time, given the clear advantages of a Taiwan scenario for justifying PLA force modernization, the PLAN and PLA arguably face less of a need to push this issue to secure increased budgetary resources.


Second, the *PLA Daily* has occasionally sent deterrent signals during periods of crisis across the Strait, publishing articles with an even more aggressive and assertive tone than contained in official government statements or the *People's Daily*. In 1999, amid the crisis sparked by Lee Teng-hui's articulation of the “two state theory” (*liangguo lun*), the *PLA Daily* issued articles by a “staff commentator” (*benbao pinglunyuan*). The first appeared in July 1999, warning “Lee Teng-hui Don't Play With Fire” [*Li Denghui buyao wanhuo*].²⁴ In

early March 2000, just before Taiwan's presidential election, the *PLA Daily* published a commentary entitled "Taiwan Independence Means War" [*Taidu' ji yiwei zhanzheng*].⁵ Since 2000, however, the *PLA Daily* has not published a staff commentary on Taiwan. As the *PLA Daily* falls under the supervision of the Central Military Commission (CMC), these articles can be interpreted as representing the PLA's perspective on the Taiwan issue, which certainly has an impact on China's Taiwan policy. Nevertheless, as the *PLA Daily* represents all of the PLA, and not just the PLAN, any specific naval influence is difficult to ascertain.

Although the role of the PLA and PLAN in the Taiwan dispute cannot be addressed fully in this paper, writings on Taiwan increasingly stress a maritime dimension. That is, the importance of Taiwan is cast in terms of its strategic value for China, not just the imperative of national unification.⁶ For Jiang Zhijun, the head of the China Naval Research Institute, "As long as the Taiwan issue isn't resolved, we will always be hindered in our capacity to defend our nation's maritime regions."⁷ According to one academic at the Shenyang Artillery Academy who specializes in maritime defense, Taiwan along with other coastal islands such as Changshan and Zhoushan serve both as military buffers for the mainland and a battlespace that links the land and the sea.⁸ An article in *Modern Navy* likewise noted Taiwan's role as China's "gate to the Pacific," allowing it to break through the "first island chain" and as a key to the defense of one-fifth of China's population along the east coast.⁹

South China Sea—the Spratly Islands

Not surprisingly, the South China Sea disputes receive less attention in news media sources than the Taiwan dispute. As China has controlled the Paracel Islands that Vietnam also claims since the early 1970s, this section focuses on China's claims to the Spratlys. Among China's maritime disputes over the sovereignty of offshore islands, the Spratlys receive much more attention in PLA media than the dispute with Japan over the Senkakus. Figure 3–4 shows the number of articles per year in the *PLA Daily* and *People's Daily* where "Spratlys" (*nansha*) appears in the title. Although both figures demonstrate the prominence of South China Sea disputes when compared with the Senkakus, coverage of these disputes has not increased over time, especially coverage of the Spratlys. The *PLA Daily* published 24 articles with "Spratlys" in the title in 1994, but only 5 such articles in 2005. Likewise, as shown in figure 3–3, the number of articles in *Modern Navy* containing the word "Spratlys" in the full text has remained steady and not increased appreciably since 1994.

Figure 3–4. The Spratlys Dispute in Core Newspapers (Title Search)

As the Spratlys played a role in efforts to justify PLAN modernization in the 1980s, the lack of continued increased coverage of this dispute is noteworthy. This trend, however, could be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it may be that growing conflict across the Strait has provided the PLAN with a much more suitable rationale for force modernization. On the other hand, the PLAN may have succeeded in the 1980s in framing China's interests in the South China Sea, especially after it occupied six features in early 1988 and Mischief Reef in late 1994. As a result, this dispute requires less attention than before, since the Spratlys are commonly accepted as an intrinsic part of Chinese territory that the PLA must defend.

Two aspects of news coverage of the Spratlys dispute support this second interpretation. First, in contrast to coverage of the Taiwan dispute, the *PLA Daily* has published more articles on the Spratlys than the *People's Daily* has published. Second, the timing and content of articles in the *PLA Daily* support the view that the PLA has taken the lead in framing this issue for the public. In contrast to articles about Taiwan (or the Senkakus discussed below), much of the *PLA Daily* reporting on the Spratlys contains original content, not Xinhua reports. Many of the *PLA Daily*-written articles discuss relatively benign topics, including how soldiers endure the hardship of such a remote

posting or the diversity of fish in the surrounding waters. In tone and content, these stories are similar to *PLA Daily* articles on garrison troops defending the first line of China's land borders, especially at high altitude and in harsh climates. Although relatively benign, such articles also help to "construct" China's interest in defending its position in these disputes and consolidate China's sovereignty claims by demonstrating the links between these distant islands and the Chinese mainland, links created by the presence of Chinese troops. Indeed, some of these "fluff" pieces in the *PLA Daily* about the troops stationed on the reefs and atolls in the South China Sea appear to be reprinted in the *People's Daily*, reversing the pattern of coverage in the Taiwan dispute.

The development of China's operational campaign doctrine suggests one explanation for the lack of a substantial increase in the attention given to the Spratlys in PLAN and PLA sources. Unlike its predecessor, the 2006 edition of *The Science of Campaigns* contains a new type of naval campaign, described as "attacks against coral islands and reefs" (*dui shanhu daojiao jingong zhanyi*), a campaign scenario that appears to be tailored to the South China Sea disputes where China might consider attacking islands and reefs held by other claimants. The discussion of the campaign is brief, only five pages long. Moreover, most of the discussion highlights the obstacles and challenges that the PLAN would face, including the distance from the mainland and difficulties in command, air defense, and logistics support along with the harsh natural environment characterized by typhoons and subsurface obstacles. The emphasis on the difficulties in the discussion of this campaign is noteworthy and suggests one reason for decreasing prominence.¹⁰

Although the Spratlys dispute is not attracting increasing attention within the PLAN or PLA, these sources stress several themes about the dispute in addition to reiterating China's sovereignty claim. The first is the threat that China faces from the other claimants. One survey of maritime hot spots on China's periphery published in *Modern Navy*, for example, notes that other claimants have "seized" (*qinzhuan*) China's islands in the South China Sea, stolen its maritime resources (especially petroleum), and threatened the lives and property of Chinese fishermen.¹¹

As this article suggests, a second and closely related theme is the link between control of disputed offshore islands and China's broader maritime rights and interests. In a *Modern Navy* article, popular military commentator Zhang Zhaozhong stresses that the islands in the South China Sea are the focal point for drawing baselines used to claim territorial waters and EEZs.¹²

A third theme is the challenge posed by outside powers to China's claims. One article in *Modern Navy*, for example, notes that the United States seeks to use the South China Sea disputes as a "trump card" (*wangpai*)

with which to contain China after the Taiwan conflict is resolved. The U.S. strengthening of military ties with other claimants in the dispute through cooperative military agreements, joint exercises, and ship visits is noted as evidence of such intentions. Likewise, Japan is seen as using its treaty with the United States to participate in efforts to protect the freedom of navigation in the adjacent sea lanes. At the same time, Japan's engagement of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states is cast as "internationalizing" the dispute to China's disadvantage.¹³

Directly or indirectly, these three themes provide rationales for strengthening China's naval power. At the same time, there is little evidence even in PLAN sources that China should abandon Deng Xiaoping's strategy for pursuing China's claims in these disputes, which calls for "setting aside conflict, pursuing joint development" (*gezhi zhengyi, gong-tong kaifa*). Thus the islands serve as a rationale for force modernization, but not necessarily a change in China's policy. Critique of Deng's dictum in PLAN or PLA sources would signal an important change and potential effort to influence national policy. At the moment, however, Deng's strategy continues to receive broad-based support in PLA publications. If the military differs slightly from discussion of Deng's policy, it is to stress the phrase "*zhuquan gui wo*" and the idea that sovereignty is nonnegotiable even while pursuing joint development.¹⁴


The other aspect of the dispute in which the PLAN might carry weight regards the role of international law. China's claim in the South China Sea is often depicted on maps by a series of 9 or 11 "dotted lines" (*duanxian*). The status of these lines in international law, however, is unclear. Noted PLA strategist at the Academy of Military Sciences, Pan Shiyong, forcefully argued after his retirement that the dotted lines refer to "historical waters" and that China can claim sovereignty over all of the territorial features in the South China Sea contained within these lines, including contested islands and reefs as well as the adjacent waters.¹⁵ UNCLOS, however, contains no provision for "historical waters" and the concept itself was developed to describe rights to enclosed areas, such as the Bohai Gulf, not waters abutting other states. At the same time, when China issued its territorial baselines in 1996, it did not draw baselines for the Spratlys, which indicated that the government's position was likely still being debated and thus room for PLAN influence exists on this issue. Zhang Zhaozhong, for example, appears to join Pan in pushing for claiming historical waters in the South China Sea on the basis of the dotted lines.¹⁶ If the PLAN, or PLA, maintains a perspective in the Spratlys dispute distinct from the government, it is likely in the interpretation of international law and how it should be applied in this conflict.

The Senkakus

What is striking about coverage of China's dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands is the lack of coverage. As figure 3–5 shows, the total number of articles with “Senkaku Islands” (*diaoyu dao*) in the title in the *PLA Daily* and *People's Daily* is low, roughly one-tenth of those published on the Spratlys.¹⁷ Moreover, no clear trend exists in the frequency or timing of articles on the Senkakus. Analysis of individual news reports suggests that the timing results from events linked to the dispute, such as attempts by activists from both sides to land on the islands in support of each country's claim. As figure 3–3 demonstrates, only 32 articles in *Modern Navy* since 1994 even mention the Senkakus anywhere in the text. Since this is a maritime sovereignty dispute with China's main rival in East Asia, one might expect the PLA to stress this conflict and to do so with increasing frequency since the mid 1990s as relations with Japan entered a more turbulent phase.

In addition, in contrast to coverage of the Spratlys, *PLA Daily* coverage of the Senkakus consists almost entirely of articles from Xinhua or the *People's Daily*. With just three exceptions, the *PLA Daily* has published no original

Figure 3–5. The Senkaku Dispute in Core Newspapers (Title Search)



content or reporting on the dispute, focusing instead on official government statements and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press conferences. Most of the reporting on the Senkakus is not on the first page, but on the inside of the paper. No staff commentaries have been authored that mention the Senkaku dispute.

An exception to the lack of original content occurred in early 2003. In January, the Japanese government announced that it would lease three of the disputed islands from a private Japanese citizen. This report unleashed a flurry of protests throughout the month in Beijing, as it appeared that Japan was consolidating its claim in the dispute. Although the *PLA Daily* printed the MFA's protest on January 5, two named articles by *PLA Daily* journalists appeared toward the end of the month. Nevertheless, these articles only reinforced the government's objections and did not adopt a more assertive or aggressive position.¹⁸

What does this mean? First, there appears to be close coordination between the government and PLA over the Senkakus dispute, at least in the area of propaganda. Overall, the goal is to minimize public discussion of the conflict, but demonstrate China's "resolute" stance on the question of sovereignty when the Japanese government is viewed as challenging China's claim. Second, both the PLA and the government likely do not want to raise expectations among the public regarding China's ability to make progress in the dispute. The islands have been under Japanese administration since 1972 and the United States indicated in the mid-1990s that the defense of the islands was included in the U.S.-Japan alliance. The islands are perhaps also a referent in the chapter on attacks against coral islands in the 2006 edition of *The Science of Campaigns* discussed above.

In the limited publications on the Senkakus, several themes emerge in PLA and PLAN writings. To start, several articles on the Senkakus offer short summaries of the historical basis for China's sovereignty claim. These articles lack an aggressive tone and do not appear to push the government to take a more assertive stance. Instead, they simply review the history of China's claims as the government has articulated publicly in the past.¹⁹

In addition, discussion of the Senkakus highlights their economic and military value. As one article in *National Defense* notes, for example, Japanese sovereignty over the islands would allow it to exploit resources in 200,000 square kilometers of "maritime national territory" (*haiyang guotu*).²⁰ Other articles stress the military value of the islands, which are located only 90 nautical miles from Taiwan. One author in *Modern Navy* notes that the islands could extend Japan's defensive range more than 300 nautical miles to the west from Okinawa, threatening China's coastal regions and Taiwan through the placement of radar or missile systems.²¹ Because of this strategic value, this article concludes that

the United States is currently examining the strategic value of the islands and “plotting” with Japan to deploy troops there. According to Jin Yinan, a professor of strategy at the PLA’s National Defense University, the military importance of the islands is to serve as a “protective screen” (*pingzhang*) for the East China Sea. At the same time, in contrast to the article in *Modern Navy*, Jin notes that the islands lack suitable conditions for the placement of military assets and stresses that their primary importance is economic.²²

Interestingly, Chinese writings differentiate between Japan’s current administration of the islands (sometimes described as “actual control” (*shiji kongzhi*) and any potential or future Japanese “occupation” of the islands. By implication, occupation, described as “*qinzhān*” or “*zhanling*,” appears to refer to any permanent military use of the islands, especially for assets that could be used in a conflict over Taiwan.²³ Thus, although only by implication, these writers have highlighted what might be viewed as a “red line” for China in its dispute with Japan.

Finally, one article on the Spratlys deserves mention, as it offers an instance of the PLAN seeking to influence national policy with respect to maritime law enforcement and the establishment of a coast guard–type capability. Published in *Modern Navy*, the article reviews the development and application of Japan’s coast guard under the alarmist title of “Warning: Japan’s Coast Guard’s Threat to Our Maritime Space.” The author first reviews the expansion of Japan’s coast guard as a military force (*junshi liliang*), highlighting its role in the Senkakus and East China Sea disputes, such as preventing Chinese protestors from landing on the islands while protecting right-wing Japanese activists. The author laments diffusion of authority for maritime law enforcement in China among a number of agencies, arguing through example that China should develop a centralized system to strengthen its ability to defend its interests at sea. Currently, China has a Maritime Safety Agency (海事局) under the Ministry of Transportation and a Maritime Patrol Detachment (海监总队) under the State Oceanic Administration (海洋局), among others. The author also notes how Japan has used its coast guard to defend its sovereignty claims, both to the Senkakus as well as in the East China Sea.²⁴

Maritime Rights and Resource Security


PLAN Focus on Maritime Resources

As China’s economy has grown, so has its demand for natural resources. This phenomenon is well reported in the Western press, and it is now common knowledge that China became a net energy importer in 1993. Since 1993, China’s imports of oil, gas, and uranium, as well as metals like tin and copper, have grown rapidly. This phenomenon has generated discussion among naval

authors along two lines. First, how can China secure more resources within its own territory to reduce import dependence? Second, for products that must be imported, how can China secure its supply in the event of a crisis? In this section we evaluate the PLAN's position on developing the resources in China's EEZ. In the next section we look at the PLAN's attitude toward protecting SLOCs.

How should China solve its growing dependence on foreign resources? Civilian and military views on this question tend to follow that iron law of bureaucratic politics: where you stand depends on where you sit. There are many potential ways for China to ameliorate its position: building a strategic oil reserve, exploiting offshore resources, increasing energy efficiency at home, just to name a few. On this issue, the PLAN has shown much more interest in developing offshore resources and placed almost no emphasis on building a strategic oil reserve; the *People's Daily*, on the other hand, has shown very little interest in offshore resources but much interest in building a strategic oil reserve. Consider figures 3–6 and 3–7:

Figure 3–6. *Modern Navy* Coverage of “Maritime Resources” (海上资源) and “Oil Reserve and China” (石油储备·中国)



Comparing *Modern Navy's* and *National Defense's* coverage of maritime resources, it also appears that the PLAN has shown more interest than the PLA as a whole. Coverage in *Modern Navy* started earlier and has continued to grow after 2004. In *National Defense*, on the other hand, coverage grew more slowly and has been declining since 2004.

Figure 3-7. *People's Daily* Coverage of “Maritime Resources” (海上资源) and “Oil Reserve and China” (石油储备·中国)





Figure 3-8. *Modern Navy and National Defense* Coverage of “Maritime Resources” (海上资源)



These graphs suggest that the PLAN places more importance on the development of maritime resources to improve China's energy security situation than either the PLA as a whole or the civilian leadership. This is not surprising; it is the one area over which the PLAN might play a leading role. But what is the case that naval authors are making for the importance of these offshore resources?

The PLAN's Case For Maritime Resources

Numerous authors in *Modern Navy* and naval authors in *National Defense* propound a similar case for focusing on maritime resources. They start with the common premise that China's population, along with the world's population, continues to increase. As a consequence of both population increase and economic growth, demand for natural resources has risen.²⁵ The problem, they argue, is that "land resources are gradually being exhausted."²⁶ Seventy-one percent of the world's surface, they happily remind us, is covered by the oceans, but to date only minimal efforts have been made to exploit maritime resources. For most of history, getting at these resources was extremely difficult or impossible; today, technological progress has made these resources accessible in a way they never have been before.²⁷ Exploiting the oceans is thus an ideal way to improve China's resource security.

The catch—and this is where the PLAN comes in—is that in order to get at maritime resources, China's territory and EEZ must be protected from other countries who want to take those resources. As Luo Xianlin, a Senior Captain in a command post in Huai Bei (淮北舰艇长), put it in 1994: "Protecting and developing the ocean's resources is a historic responsibility that our navy cannot shirk."²⁸ This new mission has been emphasized by numerous naval authors. In a series of interviews with naval academics and officers, Liu Zhenhuan (刘振环), a Senior Captain at the China Naval Research Institute (海军军事学术研究所), argued in a 2000 piece in *Modern Navy* that the PLAN must make itself capable of "protecting China's 'maritime territory' and the development of its resources . . . the scope of China's maritime defense must be enlarged to include the entirety of the waters under China's jurisdiction, including the EEZ and continental shelf."²⁹ This requires expanding traditional conceptions of maritime defense and pushing out China's defensive line. In the same series, Liu Xuxian (刘续贤), a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) and vice chair of the AMS Military Science Research Guidance Department (军事科研指导部), argued that the navy must change its strategy:

The most important elements of shifting strategy are: the navy's activities and war-planning areas should move from the coast towards nearby seas; our main tasks in warfare are shifting from protecting the country's land-mass towards protecting maritime territory, from defeating an enemy attack in nearby waters towards protecting our country's rights and interests at sea.³⁰

Zhang Shiping (章示平), an AMS researcher in the Campaign and Tactics Department (*zhanyi zhanshu bu*, 战役战术部), argued that China must change its understanding of “naval forces” to include five elements: 1) naval ships, including aircraft carriers; 2) civilian shipping vessels; 3) fishing ships; 4) oil and resource exploration ships, and 5) law enforcement ships.³¹ The significance of this is that Zhang defines naval strength not only in terms of the PLAN’s ability to defeat foreign navies, but in terms of the navy’s ability to protect the exploitation of the ocean’s resources by Chinese vessels. In doing so, Zhang defines naval strength in economic as much as in military terms. He emphasizes that “protecting the development of natural resources from being stolen or ruined is one of the basic tasks of our navy.”³²

Effect of UNCLOS

While the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) receives a fair amount of attention among naval authors, its effect is probably not that anticipated or hoped for by the framers of that document. International regimes are intended to increase cooperation and reduce conflict. In helping states to see that they can protect their interests through agreed-upon rules, rather than through military force, international regimes ideally slow the pace of arms races and military buildups. Such, at least, is the theory. The PLAN’s reaction to UNCLOS, however, has not followed such logic. Instead, naval authors see UNCLOS as increasing the scope of China’s sovereignty and thus the maritime area to be administered and secured from external threats. If UNCLOS laid down a law, the PLAN argues that there must be an entity responsible for enforcing that law—the PLAN itself.

In a 1996 piece in *National Defense*, Liu Zhenhuan (刘振环), then head of the China Naval Research Institute, analyzed the effect of UNCLOS on China’s maritime interests. UNCLOS had notable positive effects: it increased the amount of territory under China’s jurisdiction and thereby provided much space for development; it provided a legal basis for China’s exploitation of deep sea mining; it also provided for free navigation of the Tumen River; and finally, it provided military and civilian vessels free access through crucial straits and international waters. But for Liu, this does not mean that the PLAN’s responsibilities have decreased; on the contrary, it implies that they have increased. Most fundamentally, it means that China must stop thinking of its navy as a military force that spends most of its time preparing for conflict but only a short time actually fighting (*yangbing qiari, yangbing yishi*, 养兵千日, 用兵一时) and instead think of it as a force that is not only being built and improved every day, but is actually in constant use in both wartime *and* peacetime (*tiantian jian haifang, riri yong haijun*, 天天建海防, 日日用海军).³³

In a piece 10 years later in *China Military Science*, Tang Fuquan (唐复全), a professor at the Dalian Naval Ship Academy (大连舰艇学院), reiterated many of the same themes. The navy no longer need only prepare for a military showdown with another navy, but now must execute numerous functions to protect economic well-being—most important, China must be able to protect its EEZ and continental shelf. On the one hand, they argue that UNCLOS has played a “positive role in protecting the world’s economic development.” At the same time, however, they emphasize that it has also “complicated” many issues. First, because many developed countries such as the United States have not signed the convention, it is often unclear whether or not it applies. Second, countries which have signed hold different interpretations of how the law affects their claim to their maritime boundaries and to their islands. As a result, the law will cause “conflicts over maritime interests throughout the world to become more fierce.”³⁴ Similarly, Liu Zhenhuan argued that UNCLOS did not obviate the need for a strong navy: “In today’s complicated conditions in China’s surrounding waters, without a strong naval force as a shield, it is very difficult to implement scientific exploration, economic development and common development [of natural resources] in disputed waters.”³⁵ Thus, by expanding China’s maritime rights, UNCLOS has also “increased the area of the navy’s maritime activities and its enforcement responsibilities.”³⁶

Other authors have picked up on this theme. Xu Xuehou (徐学厚) of the Jinan Ground Forces Academy (济南陆军学院) argued that UNCLOS “brought us new opportunities to develop ocean resources, but has also brought us new challenges.”³⁷ A 2001 article in *Modern Navy* goes so far as to argue that because UNCLOS has given coastal countries different rights (in other words, some countries have been given more than others), UNCLOS has “to a certain extent become an incentive for both contradictions and conflict, and has even become a potential focus for regional maritime wars and military clashes.”³⁸ While this position is extreme, what is representative about his thinking is that UNCLOS does not reduce, and probably increases, the need for naval development. A 1999 article in *Modern Navy* similarly argues that since the 1990s, with the expansion of maritime interests to include EEZs, coastal Third World countries gained huge amounts of fishing and mineral resources, but that this creates a real challenge, namely, how to protect territory that is 200 nautical miles off the coastline.³⁹ Indeed, these articles conclude China’s navy remains unable to accomplish these tasks and thus unable to protect China’s *haiquan*. Therefore, to meet these new challenges, China must continue to build up its navy.

Some PLAN sources raise questions about certain provisions within UNCLOS. For example, PLAN authors question both the “right of innocent

passage” within a country’s territorial waters as well as through “freedom of navigation and overflight” in a country’s EEZ, especially for military ships. This provision is seen as allowing “hegemonic” states to pursue “gun-boat diplomacy.”⁴⁰ During the 2001 EP-3 incident, the *PLA Daily* issued a staff commentary, charging that it represented a serious violation of China’s sovereignty. In particular, the commentary charged that the U.S. plane had disregarded the international legal regulations on freedom of overflight by conducting surveillance in the airspace above the coastal areas of China’s EEZ.⁴¹ The implication was that UNCLOS prohibits (or should prohibit) military activities in a country’s EEZ, a theme that a Chinese international legal scholar echoed in the *People’s Daily* on the same day.⁴²

As a result, Dalian Naval Vessel Academy Professor Tang Fuquan proposed several ways in which China could improve its position in the competition over maritime rights created by the passage of UNCLOS. First, China should conduct extensive surveys of its maritime boundaries in preparation for delimitation negotiations. Second, China should strengthen its maritime legal regime, citing gaps in current domestic and international laws that China could use to protect its maritime rights. Third, China should enforce maritime law through a centralized system that would enable effective monitoring of areas under China’s jurisdiction and through increased range and frequency of patrols in these areas.⁴³

In sum, Chinese naval authors see the protection of China’s EEZ as a vital means of developing offshore natural resources. While these rights are legally protected by UNCLOS, PLAN authors believe that they themselves must be able to enforce the terms of that treaty. In order to do so, China must continue its naval buildup.

Energy Security vs. Resource Security

In discussions of China’s growing dependence on imported raw materials, the concepts of “resource security” and “energy security” seem to be used interchangeably. In fact, however, while related, the two concepts actually address slightly different issues. Keyword searches of both concepts in a variety of journals show that the PLA has consistently been more interested in the concept of resource security, while civilians have emphasized energy security. Consider figures 3–9 and 3–10 below. A full-text search in *Modern Navy* for both concepts shows that while both have been growing rapidly, there is greater emphasis on resource security. This is even more pronounced in *National Defense*.

It is worth comparing these charts with data from the *People’s Daily* for the same two searches; as can be seen in figure 3–11, the results are basically opposite.

Figure 3-9. *Modern Navy Coverage of “Energy Security” (能源安全) and “Resource Security” (资源安全) (Full-text Search)*




Figure 3-10. *National Defense Coverage of “Energy Security” (能源安全) and “Resource Security” (资源安全) (Full-text Search)*





Figure 3–11. *People’s Daily* Coverage of “Energy Security” (能源安全) and “Resource Security” (资源安全) (Full-text Search)



These searches may suggest that the PLA has a broader conception of import dependence than the civilian leadership has. Indeed, authors in *Modern Navy* and *National Defense* talk not only about energy security (see the next section on SLOCs for more), but also about resource security in general. This includes mined products from the ocean (hence the higher amount of attention paid to maritime resources), and also food. In fact, several authors emphasize that as China’s population grows and land is paved over for industrial or commercial use, food imports will increase. One place where China can make up some of the difference is in food products harvested from the ocean; this, in turn, requires a navy able to protect fishermen in Chinese waters and beyond.⁴⁴

Sea Lines of Communications

The difficulty of analyzing the PLAN’s attitude toward the protection of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) is that there is no issue on which there is a greater diversity of opinions, both within the Chinese military and between the Chinese military and civilians. Some are convinced that there is no problem at all; others argue the problem is primarily political and not military; and others argue that China must rapidly build up the capability to escort oil resources home. At the same time, because the issue is politically sensitive in the United States, it can often be interpreted as a litmus test among Chinese

officers for their level of hawkishness. A quick glance at a search for “sea lanes” below (figures 3–12 and 3–13) shows that while *National Defense* did increase its coverage of the issue slightly in the early 2000s, that coverage has since fallen back to just above original levels in the early 1990s. Similarly, the *People’s Daily* has seen only a modest increase. In *Modern Navy*, however, the issue has continued to grow in importance. The case is even more pronounced when searching for the related concept of “sea lane security” (航线安全). The issue gets a large and growing amount of attention in *Modern Navy*, with minimal and non-increasing coverage in the other three.

No geographic region is a greater source of concern than the Malacca Strait. When Hu Jintao regularly uses the phrase “the Malacca Dilemma” (马六甲困境), he is referring to the fact that a large and growing percentage of China’s imported oil (about 75 percent) is shipped through that strategic waterway. This growing concern over the security of the Malacca Strait is reflected in the following full text search (figure 3–14). As can be seen, *Modern Navy* has been writing about the Malacca Strait security issue since 1994, while the *People’s Daily* only began real coverage of the issue in 2002. Interestingly, *National Defense* has paid only minimal attention to the issue. As these two charts show, sea lane security has become an increasingly important issue for the PLAN, suggesting that this may be one policy area in the future where the navy exerts special influence.

Figure 3–12. *Modern Navy*, *National Defense*, *People’s Daily*, and *PLA Daily* Coverage of “Sea Lanes” (海上通道)





Figure 3–13. *Modern Navy, National Defense, People’s Daily, and PLA Daily Coverage of “Sea Lane Security” (航线安全)*




The issue of “sea lanes,” however, is not monolithic: it is composed of many smaller issues which deserve to be analyzed separately. This is because sea lanes can come under threat for a variety of reasons and in a variety of locations from a variety of different sources. In this section, therefore, we first focus on two potential threats to sea lanes—piracy and terrorism. We discuss the PLAN’s attitude toward the risk of a great power blockade and who might potentially instigate such a blockade. Here we find an unexpected amount of attention paid to the intentions and capabilities of the Indian navy. Finally, we provide two opposing viewpoints from civilian and military sources, which argue that China’s SLOC problem is actually a problem best solved by market or diplomatic, not military, means.

Piracy and Terrorism

What are the threats to Chinese shipping through the Malacca Strait? One clear threat is pirate attacks (or a potential terrorist attack). On this issue, though, there is a variety of opinion among naval authors. The *People’s Daily*, the *PLA Daily*, and *Modern Navy* have all focused quite a bit of attention on the topic. In fact, the full-text searches (figure 3–15) indicate the navy was, if anything, led by the civilians in terms of drawing attention to the issue, with *Modern Navy* having very little coverage in the early 1990s but increasing its coverage throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s.


Figure 3–14. *Modern Navy, National Defense, and People’s Daily Coverage of “Malacca Strait and Security”* (马六甲。安全) (Full-text Search)



In general, naval authors are less afraid of piracy itself than they are of the prospect that other countries (the United States, Japan, India) will use piracy as an excuse to set up bases or increase naval activity in the Malacca Strait region. It is worth noting that both the 2000 and 2006 editions of *The Science of Campaigns* do not discuss operations to protect against piracy. To be sure, though, there are authors who acknowledge that piracy or a terrorist attack would have a devastating impact on the East Asian economy. A July 2006 article in *Modern Navy* by staff writer Zhang Gang (张刚) points out that pirate attacks are increasing in the region, and that a terrorist attack which closed down Singapore could cost the world \$200 billion a year.⁴⁵ The *PLA Daily* has run reports that al Qaeda has as many as 25 ships, and that a terrorist attack could devastate shipping.⁴⁶ Most of the articles on piracy in *Modern Navy* are written by staff writers, and tend to be largely descriptive.⁴⁷ To the extent that these authors discuss dealing with the piracy problem, the focus tends to be on supporting the efforts of the countries bordering the strait (Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia), and engaging in cooperative police efforts. For example, Zhang Gang praises the statement made at the 2003 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting that promises to deal with the piracy problem.

Naval publications, however, tend to be less worried about both piracy and terrorism than they are about the use of those problems as an excuse for foreign navies to increase their presence in the region. A 2000 piece in

Figure 3–15. *Modern Navy*, *PLA Daily*, and *People’s Daily* Coverage of “Pirates” (海盜) (Full-text Search)



Modern Navy describes Japanese policy after a 1999 hijacking of a Japanese ship (carrying aluminum) which ended up costing \$20 million. The Japanese responded by sending their navy into the Malacca Strait. But this article argues that piracy is merely an excuse: tracing Japanese naval policy from before World War II to the Gulf War, the author argues that Japan has used any opportunity to increase the range of its navy. While Japanese actions have thus far been cooperative, the size of the Japanese navy is expanding, cooperation with India is increasing, and military exercises are becoming more frequent. The article ends by saying that Japanese warships, 56 years after the end of the “Southern Advance” policy, are now returning to Southeast Asia, and asking: “When thinking about this, people will always wonder: ‘is this really to defeat piracy?’”⁴⁸

A similar tack is taken in response to American efforts to fight terrorism in the region. A July 2004 piece in *Modern Navy* acknowledges that terrorism is a real threat, but that the United States (and Japan) now claim that “the entire world has become a terrorist world . . . fighting terrorism has already become a kind of fashion, and fighting terrorism has become a perfect excuse for some countries to interfere in other countries’ affairs.”⁴⁹ The real reason the United States wants to control the Malacca Strait is both to protect trade and to protect the U.S. Navy’s route from Japanese bases to the Persian Gulf should the need arise. But this severely affects China’s interests:

The Malacca Strait is an important node in China's ocean oil lifeline, and is directly related to China's economic security. According to statistics, of all the ships that cross the Malacca Strait every day, almost 60% are bound for China, and of those the vast majority carry oil. So we can say that whoever controls the Malacca Strait can control China's strategic oil lifeline, and can thereby threaten China's energy security at any time.⁵⁰

Furthermore, for China's navy to sail out to the rest of the world, it must cross the Malacca Strait; for example, the PLAN's 2002 global tour went through it.

In his 2006 article, Zhang Gang makes a similar case: that the United States, Japan, and India are all using the piracy/terrorism issue as an excuse to get a foothold in the Malacca region. To counteract this trend, Zhang proposes that China provide more aid to the regional countries so as to balance (抗衡) American and Japanese efforts. This will "increase China's influence in the region, and also accords with ASEAN's traditional policy of balance in foreign diplomacy."⁵¹

The Indian Threat

Three countries are the focus in discussions of how to protect China's SLOCs: Japan, the United States, and India. Japan's efforts to extend the reach of its navy are worrisome for both territorial reasons and the historic animosity between the two countries; the United States cannot be ignored because of the power of its navy. And, as shown above, there is coverage of both countries; in particular, American efforts to secure a base of operations in the region after leaving Subic Bay in the Philippines are reported.⁵² Indeed, articles in *Modern Navy* often refer to the United States' 1986 declaration to control the world's 16 key straits, and put the Malacca Dilemma into that context.⁵³ Surprisingly, though, attention to the Indian Ocean and the Indian navy are growing rapidly in naval discussions. This anxiety stems from geography: China's most important SLOCs run through the Indian Ocean. These authors go on to analyze both India's intentions and its capabilities, and infer both from Indian statements and from growing cooperation with the United States and Japan (for example in the Malabar Exercises of 2007) that China's oil from Africa and the Middle East may be threatened.

Consider the full-text searches for "Indian Navy" shown in figures 3-16 and 3-17. While the *PLA Daily* dramatically increased its coverage of the Indian navy starting in the late 1990s, the *People's Daily* only increased slightly in 2004, and has since fallen back to original levels. A similar phenomenon can be observed in comparing *Modern Navy* and *National Defense*. While coverage in *Modern Navy* increased by the mid 1990s, that in *National Defense* has remained constant over the past decade. This suggests that increasing coverage in the *PLA Daily* was driven by increasing attention to the PLAN's point of view, similar to coverage of the Malacca Strait.

Figure 3-16. *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily* Coverage of “Indian Navy” (印度海军) (Full-text Search)





Figure 3-17. *Modern Navy* and *National Defense* Coverage of “Indian Navy” (印度海军) (Full-text Search)



Indian Intentions

What are naval authors actually writing about the Indian navy? First, they are worried about India's desire to control the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean holds China's most crucial SLOCs—those that link it to its supplies of oil in the Middle East and Africa. In 2002, *Modern Navy* published an article written by a Pakistani naval officer who argued that India wanted to turn the Indian Ocean into "India's lake." In addition to representing a grave threat to Pakistan, India's increasingly powerful navy poses a threat to Chinese SLOCs. The author concludes by exhorting China to build up its navy faster.⁵⁴ As early as 1994, the *PLA Daily* asserted that India's navy "intends to control the Indian Ocean"⁵⁵ and even to "make the Indian Ocean 'India's Ocean.'"⁵⁶ By 2001, however, naval authors were asserting much larger ambitions as part of India's "go East" policy to develop a presence in the Pacific. A September 2001 article in *Modern Navy* argued that India had a four directional strategy: defend against China in the North, attack Pakistan to the West, occupy the Indian Ocean to the South, and increase its sphere of influence to the East. The goal of all these activities is to "contain China" (*qianzhi zhongguo*, 牵制中国).⁵⁷

Naval authors also infer Indian intentions from growing cooperation with the United States and Japan. In 2002, *Modern Navy* translated an article from a U.S. naval officer describing the reasons for the increasing U.S. cooperation with India, which even asserted that, while there are obstacles, the U.S. Navy hopes to build a level of cooperation with the Indian navy equal to that of its cooperation with Japan and Great Britain.⁵⁸ A 2001 article in *Modern Navy* described growing Japanese and Indian "global cooperation," with military exercises in Southeast Asia, followed by joint antipiracy exercises in 2001. The author asserts that Japan must really want to cooperate with India because Japan broke with its own precedent and downgraded sanctions against India for its nuclear test.⁵⁹ The Malabar Exercises of 2007 undoubtedly strengthened the PLAN's worries. Not only has India increased cooperation with Japan and the United States, but it also enjoys close relations with ASEAN. Indeed, while Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have been cautious about accepting help from the American or Japanese navies, they have sought more active cooperation with India. For example, in the 2004 antipiracy exercises, India was invited to participate while the United States was not.⁶⁰

Indian Capabilities

If PLAN sources perceive Indian intentions to be aimed at containing China, they also see India rapidly building the capabilities necessary to do so. *Modern Navy* has covered India's naval buildup fairly extensively. In April 2003, it ran an article titled: "Will the South China Sea Become the 'Second

Persian Gulf?” that laid out India’s 2003 plan to spend \$62 billion over the next 22 years to modernize the navy, and also detailed India’s growing interactions with ASEAN. In a December 2005 article, *National Defense* asserted that India seeks to have a top four navy by 2010.⁶¹ An October 2005 article in the *PLA Daily* described the efforts India is making as part of its new strategy to “destroy the enemy in distant seas” (远海歼敌). As part of this effort, India spent \$3.5 billion buying submarines from France, and plans under “Project 75” to build 20 nuclear attack submarines equipped with long distance cruise missiles over the next 30 years. In addition, India is building aircraft carriers, with the first homemade aircraft carrier expected to be operational in 2012.⁶² Indeed, the *PLA Daily* also reported that India wants to develop an aircraft carrier fleet on a par with England’s, and that this fleet will allow it to move into the Pacific.⁶³


The concern over growing Indian capabilities is perhaps most clear in the increasing attention *Modern Navy* paid to the Indian naval base in the Andaman Islands. Consider the full-text keyword search in figure 3–18.

The Indian decision to build a naval base in the Andaman Islands is significant due to its strategic location. In his July 2006 article in *Modern Navy*, Zhang Gang argues that India intends to use the Andamans/Nicobar as a base for extending influence or controlling the Sunda Strait (between Java and Sumatra); the Palk Strait (between India and Sri Lanka); the Mandab Strait (between Yemen and East Africa); and the Hormuz Strait (Persian Gulf outlet).⁶⁴ A June 2004 article is worth quoting at length:

India is telling the world that the purpose of its base in the Andaman Islands is to stop weapons smuggling and piracy, to protect its naval rights and interests, and to improve its military cooperation with ASEAN, etc. But hidden in this action is their true intention to contain China’s activities in the Indian Ocean, and also to control the Malacca Strait, and gradually to enlarge their sphere of influence into the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean area. India sees China as a long term potential opponent, and the Indian military has on numerous occasions repeated this nonsense about China having ambitions in the Indian Ocean, helping Burma build military bases, and rapidly building up its navy so that within fifteen years it can cross the Malacca Strait and into the Indian Ocean, which is a challenge to India’s naval strategy. Using this groundless excuse, the Andaman Islands have become a forward base for Indian’s containment of China.⁶⁵

The article goes on to accuse India of trying to become the hegemon of the Indian Ocean, but also worries about India’s statement in 2001 that it should be a part of protecting SLOCs all the way to Japan.

Figure 3–18. *Modern Navy* Coverage of “Andaman” (安达曼)
(Full-text Search)



Chinese naval authors seem to worry about India for two reasons. First, because it is in the process of military buildup, its future power remains unknown. Compared to the United States, therefore, the future of the Indian navy is difficult to predict. Second, the Indian navy enjoys a political position in Southeast Asia which neither the United States nor Japan can claim. Japan, due to its World War II history, and the United States, due to its power, both draw suspicions in Southeast Asia. India, on the other hand, has no historical burden and is much less powerful, and therefore finds it easier to cooperate with ASEAN states.

Opposing Viewpoint 1: SLOCs Can Be Protected by Free Trade

The question of whether the PLAN needs the capabilities to protect SLOCs is becoming controversial. A 1999 article in *Modern Navy* reviews the past 100 years of trade over the oceans, concluding that “free trade” is often just a “façade for hegemony.” For example, during the Cold War the United States did not promote free trade with the Communist world, and at various points imposed sanctions on China, which, he argues, can help to explain China’s underdevelopment. The implication is that “free trade” cannot be depended on to provide for China as it can always be cut off by the hegemon.⁶⁶ Similarly, an August 2004 article in *Modern Navy* argues that economics and free trade cannot protect China’s oil supply, claiming that “The market decides

the price of oil, but politics determines where it flows. . . . It is easy to see that without economic and military power, it is very hard to control the effects of geopolitics, and very hard to protect energy security.”⁶⁷ The article goes on to suggest that, just as India, the United States, and Japan have done, China too should use piracy and terrorism as reasons to expand its naval presence. Building its navy will allow China to “stabilize the supply chain.”

These mercantilist views clearly favor the institutional interests of the navy (see the conclusion), but there is some evidence that civilians are starting to push back. In a provocative June 2007 piece in *Contemporary International Relations*, Zhao Hongtu (赵宏图), a researcher at CICIR (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations) who focuses on energy and resource issues, lays out a comprehensive case against China developing such naval capabilities. He states bluntly, presumably referring to the kinds of arguments made above, that some “lack an understanding of a market economy, and this has led people to an inadequate understanding of mutual dependence in global oil markets and in the globalized economy.”⁶⁸ Zhao’s argument is that the United States is extremely unlikely to impose a blockade of the Malacca Strait because doing so would cause a huge spike in global oil prices, which would hurt it just as badly as everyone else. Mikkal E. Herberg, the research director of the Energy Security Program at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), told the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission that while mercantilist ideas about locking up supplies still exist, more and more the Chinese are understanding that oil is one global market and that barrels are always available at the market price.⁶⁹ Presumably, Zhao and others in China are helping to spread this understanding. Second, any blockade of the Malacca Strait would affect Japan and Korea—two U.S. allies—as badly as it affected China, because distinguishing which ships are bound for which ports is no easy task. He also cites a report from the CATO Institute saying that the United States does not have the capability to block the Malacca Strait.

More important, though, Zhao argues that China should not be making policy based on “in the event something happens [一旦有事],” or “under special circumstances [特殊情况下].” Zhao levels a variety of critiques of such thinking. First, such thinking is only related to energy supply in the event of a war—but if war can be avoided, then there is no need for military protection of the energy supply. Second, in the event of a war China has more than enough oil domestically produced to supply the military itself, and simpler methods such as a strategic oil reserve can provide a buffer for the domestic economy. But it is unrealistic to think that in the event of war there would be some way to completely insulate the domestic economy from ill effects. Third, even if the Malacca Strait is blockaded or blocked due to piracy or terrorism, having tankers sail around through other Indonesian straits would only add marginally

to the price of oil and is hardly worth fighting over (he refers to the blockade on oil shipping through the Suez Canal when Western countries had to start going around the Cape of Good Hope, which did not devastate the economy). Fourth, he argues that efforts on the part of the Chinese navy are already beginning a spiral of hostility, and therefore that such efforts are likely to bring on precisely the sort of threat to energy security that China should try to avoid. Finally, he argues that piracy and terrorism are threats, but not of the sort that can dramatically alter China's energy situation, and should be handled with military-to-military cooperation. It will be interesting to see whether and how Zhao's argument is responded to by the PLAN (and others whose interests he implicitly attacks—he argues against pipelines, for example, claiming that they are even more vulnerable to terrorism than shipping).

Opposing Viewpoint 2: SLOC Protection Is a Political, Not a Military, Problem

If Zhao asserts that the market rather than the military will solve China's SLOC problem, another school of thought argues that politics is the appropriate means to protect China's SLOCs. In the January 2007 issue of *China Military Science*, Feng Liang (冯梁) and Duan Yanzhi (段延志) of the Naval Command Academy (海军指挥学院) repeat familiar arguments about China's growing dependence on international markets, but come to a very different conclusion. They argue that

on the surface, the SLOC issue appears to be an issue of the security of sea lanes; in reality it is an issue of [political] stability in the oceans. Suppose we don't have close security cooperation with countries bordering crucial SLOCs, then even if we have a strong naval force, we still won't be able to protect the security of long SLOCs . . . creating a secure geopolitical environment in the oceans has become an important condition for China's sustained development in this new century.⁷⁰

In other words, building a powerful navy is inadequate for the protection of China's vital sea lanes and can be at best only one part of a larger strategy to protect them. The bulk of the focus must be on political and diplomatic efforts to improve coordination and cooperation with countries astride key sea lanes and, presumably, with countries whose navies control those sea lanes. This line of thinking is also endorsed by Bi Yurong (毕玉蓉) of the PLA's Academy of International Relations, who advocates a variety of measures for protecting China's SLOCs, including improving relations with ASEAN states and diversifying the sources of supply and transportation routes (he refers to creating a "spider web" [蛛网式] of supply lines).⁷¹

It is interesting to note that one political method under discussion by naval authors in the context of UNCLOS is passing domestic laws to supplement areas in which UNCLOS is vague. In a 2006 article in *China Military Science*, Tang Fuquan and coauthors discuss the relationship between domestic law and international law. They argue that while international law provides an overall basis, UNCLOS has areas which are not clear or are not fair, and domestic law can thus help to “reinforce and enrich particular countries’ maritime legal system.”⁷² The authors refer to several laws that China has already passed, the most important being the “Law of China’s Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone” (passed in February 1992) and the “Law of China’s EEZ and Continental Shelf” (passed in June 1998). The idea of passing more domestic laws has been suggested by others as well⁷³ and suggests that the Anti-Secession Law of 2005 may be inspiring other attempts to enshrine international goals in domestic laws. Unfortunately, what to do if various parties to UNCLOS pass mutually conflictual domestic laws is not addressed.

What these approaches—pursuing international agreements, friendly diplomacy, and passing domestic laws—share is the belief that the protection of China’s international interests depends on more than just a strong navy. But it is clear that a debate is brewing over how best to protect China’s energy supply; in *China Military Science*’s second 2007 issue, Wang Shumei and others argue that China’s SLOCs can only be protected by building a stronger navy.⁷⁴

Conclusion: Navy and the Budget

One assumption in bureaucratic politics is that every institution tries to make itself as essential as possible so as to increase its share of the budget. There is some evidence to suggest that the PLAN is no exception. First, in addition to generic calls for China to build a powerful navy, some authoritative authors have directly called for an increase in the percentage of the military budget that is devoted to the PLAN. In the July 2007 issue of *National Defense*, a vice-head of the PLAN political department, two star Admiral Yao Wenhui (姚文怀), writes that China should

gradually increase the proportion [of money] spent on naval development. In military development, whether the amount of money spent on each branch is reasonable is decided by the country’s security situation and the military tasks it faces. For a long period of time, our military’s main task has been to protect the borders and defend our territory, so the army always had a relatively large proportion. For a while, this proportion accorded with the demands of the times. But as the world political situation has changed, as the revolution in military affairs and the forms

of warfare have changed, as well as the needs of the country's development and security, our army's traditional system of having a "big land force" is no longer suitable for today's situation and tasks, and we must therefore increase the percentage spent on the navy.⁷⁵

But what are these new needs that Yao refers to? Overall, the PLAN seems to be casting itself not only as a consumer of China's rapid economic growth, but as the protector of and potential contributor to that economic growth. To a certain extent, naval authors acknowledge that spending on the military means less money that can be spent on economic development and improving living standards for the people. A January 2006 article in *National Defense* argues that in a market economy, "the relationship between national defense building and economic development is both mutually contradictory [相互矛盾] and mutually promoting [相互促进]."⁷⁶ It is obvious that military spending and economic development can be at odds, but on what grounds are naval authors arguing that the relationship can be productive?

Naval authors rely on four main arguments, some of which, as suggested by Yao, follow directly from new interests generated by Chinese economic growth. First, the PLAN is the only branch of the military that can protect the exploitation of China's maritime resources. Given the risk that a lack of resources becomes a bottleneck in the Chinese economy, spending on the PLAN may well turn out to be a good investment for the future. Second, the PLAN is the only branch of the military capable of protecting China's developed eastern coast and its sea lanes. Yao writes:

The heart of our country's economy is more and more concentrated in coastal areas; if the coastal areas are not safe, then we can't even begin to talk about the safety of our economy; maritime shipping and energy and resource SLOCs have already become the vital vein of our economy and societal development, especially oil and other important imported materials; our dependence on maritime shipping is big, and so protecting our country's SLOCs is extremely important.⁷⁷

Third, naval authors are also making more subtle arguments for increased funding. Yao makes the case that naval spending can stimulate the economy by comparing China to America. He argues that much of the technology which led the American economy to boom came out of research done by the military. To achieve similar results, the navy is precisely the branch of the military to invest in because it is the branch which requires the highest technology, and therefore has the highest likelihood of spillover to the civilian economy. Fourth, naval authors insist that the PLAN is the only branch of the military that has major peacetime missions to accomplish (fighting piracy, protecting sea lanes, defending areas with natural resource development).

Further, they argue that it is the service with the farthest reach, as it can show the flag all over the world in a way no other branch can.

The PLAN, of course, also continues to assert that the situation with Taiwan is only growing more and more dangerous—and hence the continued need to fund the PLAN. But even on the Taiwan issue we can observe a shift in PLAN arguments; while the unification of China was long simply assumed to be an important end goal of China's foreign policy, there is some evidence to suggest that it is also being viewed as a means to other ends, namely, the creation of a platform upon which to defend China's EEZ, contested islands, and vital sea lanes, all of which in turn protect China's economy. Thus even the Taiwan issue is starting to be portrayed in the same way: that spending on the navy is an investment in China's economy.

In addition, the analysis presented in this paper highlights a number of specific issues where the PLAN may seek to shape national policy debates. One issue concerns how China will interpret international maritime law. PLAN and PLA sources promote the concept of "historical waters" as the basis of China's claim to islands in the South China Sea as well as surrounding waters, but the Chinese government has not clarified its position. Likewise, several sources indicate dissatisfaction with elements of UNCLOS and support an interpretation of certain provisions such as freedom of navigation to strengthen China's influence. A second issue concerns the importance of establishing a strong and centralized maritime law enforcement agency along the lines of the U.S. Coast Guard, an issue likely to build support from certain sectors within the government. A third issue is the current emphasis on sea lane security and potential threats that China faces.

Beyond these specific issues, the overall unifying theme has been to cast the PLAN as the protector of China's economy. Indeed, there is a tendency to reverse the common logic of "rich country, strong army" (富国强兵). PLAN authors do acknowledge that a big economy allows the material basis for a strong army, but also assert that without a strong army, one cannot have a strong economy. Yao argues that excessive military spending without economic development spells doom (he cites the Soviet Union), but that no military spending with excessive wealth also spells doom (he cites Kuwait). This logic is laid out even more bluntly by Wang Shumei et al.:

The strength of rights and interests at sea and a country's rise and fall are correlated phenomena . . . if the navy does not have great strength, then it may be a burden on the country, becoming merely a consumer [消耗, of resources]; but if the navy is a strong force, then it can create a positive effect, and create a virtuous cycle with promoting overall development. Naval power is directly proportional to the development of a country's maritime interests.⁷⁸

In other words, if small amounts of money are spent on naval development, it will be a drag on the economy, but if large amounts are spent and a strong navy is created, then it will actually promote economic development. The overall point here echoes Yao's: strong navies don't just emerge from strong economies; rather, strong navies can help to generate strong economies.

Notes

¹ Niu Baocheng, "Cong haiquan dao junshi haiquan" [From Rights and Interests at Sea to Military Rights and Interests at Sea], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. S1 (2000), 32. No rank or affiliation is listed for the author.

² For detailed statistics on invasions China has suffered from the sea, see Yao Wenhui, "Jianshe qiandaguo haijun weihu woguo haiyang zhanlue liyi" [Build a Powerful Navy and Protect Our Country's Strategic Maritime Interests], *Guofang*, no. 7 (2007), 1. The author is a Rear Admiral and the director of the PLAN's Political Department.

³ These search criteria were intended to return articles linked clearly with the dispute over Taiwan and not the mention of Taiwan for reasons related to cross-Straits trade and communication. "Taidu" refers clearly to the nature of the dispute.

⁴ *Jiefangjun Bao*, July 15, 1999, 1.

⁵ *Jiefangjun Bao*, March 6, 2000, 1.

⁶ For an excellent review of the geostrategic rationales for the importance of Taiwan to the CCP, see Alan M. Wachman, *Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), especially chapter 7.

⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, 145. For the original interview with Jiang Zhijun, see "Zhongguo haijun junshi xueshu yanjiusuo suozhang tan Zhongguo haishang youhuan" [China Naval Research Institute Director Discusses China's Maritime Concerns], *PLA Daily Web* site, January 2, 2004, available at <http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladaily/2004/01/02/20040102001237_zgjs.html>.

⁸ Gao Xinsheng, "Daoyu yu xin shiji zhongguo haifang jianshe" [Islands and China's Maritime Defense Construction in the New Century], *Guofang*, no. 11 (2006), 47.

⁹ Qiao Li, "Taiwan, hezhi shi 'bu shen de hangkong mujian'" [Taiwan, Much More Than an Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 2 (1998), 14. The author's rank and affiliation are not given.

¹⁰ Zhang Yuliang, ed., *Zhanyi Xue [The Science of Campaigns]* (Beijing: Guofangdaxue chubanshe, 2006), 535–538.

¹¹ Qing Zhou, "Guanzhu woguo zhoubian haiyang redian wenti" [Pay Attention to Our Country's Maritime Hotspots on the Periphery], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 9 (2004), 63. No rank or affiliation is noted for the author.

¹² Zhang Zhaozhong, "Nan Zhongguo hai wenti zhi wo jian" [The South China Sea Problem in My Eyes], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 5 (2000), 3.

¹³ Li Xiaonian and Chen Liejing, "Nan zhongguo hai cheng wei 'di er bosiwang' ma?" [Is the South China Sea Becoming a "Second Persian Gulf"?], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 4 (2003), 9–10. The authors are journalists for *Modern Navy*.

¹⁴ Zhang, "Nan Zhongguo hai wenti zhi wo jian," 5.

¹⁵ Pan Shiyong, *Nansha qundao, shiyong zhengzhi, guoji fa* [The Spratlys Archipelago, Oil Politics, International Law] (Xianggang: Xianggang jingji daobao chubanshe, 1996), 131–171. Also, see Pan's 1995 interview in *Modern Navy*, in Qu Shiqiang, "Nansha, Dang shu shejia?: Fang Zhongguo haiyang zhanlue zhuanjia Pan Shiyong jiaoshou" [Spratlys, Who Do They Belong To? Interview with China Maritime Strategy Expert Professor Pan Shiyong], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 4 (2005), 20.

¹⁶ See, for example, Gao Xinsheng, "Zhongguo haifang fazhan mianlin de zhuyao tiaozhan yu duice" [Key Challenges Facing the Development of China's Maritime Defense and Policy Countermeasures], *Guofang*, no. 11 (2005), 63; Zhang, "Nan Zhongguo hai wenti zhi wo jian," 3–5; "Jin Yinan tan Zhongguo Diaoyudao xianzhuang" [Jin Yinan Discusses the Present Condition of China's Diaoyu Islands], online content on *PLA Daily Web* site, at <http://www.pladaily.com.cn/site1/ztpd/2006-01/25/content_393925.htm>.

¹⁷ This paper was written before the 2010 incident involving the arrest of a Chinese fisherman by the Japanese Coast Guard. Undoubtedly, the number of articles related to the Senkakus and the East China Sea will have increased in this time period.

¹⁸ *Jiefangjun Bao*, January 20, 2003, 11 and *Jiefangjun Bao*, January 27, 2003, 7.

¹⁹ Yao Bailin, “Diaoyudao zhuquan sukao” [Reflecting and Examining the Diaoyu Islands Sovereignty], *Guofang*, no. 5, (2004), 54; and Lin Mu, “Diaoyudao wenti huigu” [Reflections on the Diaoyu Islands Problem], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 5 (2000), 33–34. Yao is affiliated with the Political Warfare Department in the Guangzhou MR Joint Logistics Department.

²⁰ Gao Xinsheng, “Daoyu yu xin shiji zhongguo haifang jianshe” [Islands and China’s Maritime Defense Construction in the New Century], *Guofang*, no. 11 (2006), 46. Gao is affiliated with the Shenyang Artillery Academy.

²¹ Du Chaoping, “Meiguo miaozhun Diaoyudao” [America Takes Aim at the Diaoyu Islands], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 7 (2003), 36. No affiliation or rank for Du is reported.

²² “Jin Yinan tan Zhongguo Diaoyudao xianzhaung.”

²³ Du, “Meiguo miaozhun Diaoyudao,” 37; and Gao, “Daoyu yu xin shiji zhongguo haifang jianshe,” 47.

²⁴ Chen Shangjun, “Jingti: Riben haishang bao’an ting dui wo haiyu de weixie” [Warning: Japan’s Maritime Safety Agency’s Threat to Our Country’s Maritime Space], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 1 (2005), 30–31. No affiliation or rank for Chen is reported.

²⁵ See, for example, Xu Xuehou, “Shidai huhuan haiyangguan” [The Era Calls for Understanding of the Oceans], *Guofang*, no. 5 (1999), 13. The author is from the Jinan Ground Forces Academy.

²⁶ Qiao Lin, “Haishang zhengba yibai nian” [One Hundred Years of Struggle to Control the Ocean], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 6 (1999), 53. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

²⁷ Qing Dan, “Guanzhu woguo zhoubian haiyang redian wenti” [Pay Attention to Our Country’s Controversial Ocean Issues], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 9 (2004), 62. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

²⁸ Luo Xianlin, “Haiyang yishi: Yige buneng huibi de huati” [Ocean Consciousness: A Topic Which Cannot Be Avoided], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 5 (1994), 15.

²⁹ Liu Zhenhuan et al., “Zoujin haiyang shiji qiangda Zhongguo haijun” [Enter the New Century of the Ocean, Strengthen China’s Navy], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 1 (2000), 4.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

³¹ Also see Feng Liang and Duan Yanzhi, “Zhongguo haiyang diyuan anquan tezheng yu xin shiji haishang anquan zhanlue” [Characteristics of China’s Sea Geostategic Security and Sea Security Strategy for the New Century], *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, no. 1 (2007), 29. They also emphasize more than just military ships in the definition of naval strength.

³² Liu, “Zoujin haiyang shiji qiangda Zhongguo haijun,” 6.

³³ Liu Zhenhuan, “Lianheguo haiyangfa gongyue pingshu (xia)” [An Appraisal of the UN Law of the Sea (Part II)], *Guofang*, no. 11 (1996), 15.

³⁴ Tang Fuquan et al., “Zhongguo haiyang weiquan zhanlue chutan” [Initial Thoughts on the Strategy to Protect China’s Ocean Interests], *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, no. 6 (2006), 63.

³⁵ Liu, “Lianheguo haiyangfa gongyue pingshu (xia),” 15.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

³⁷ Xu, “Shidai huhuan haiyangguan,” 13.

³⁸ Luo Qing, “21 Shiji shenhai zuozhan yanxi” [An Analysis of Deep Ocean Fighting in the 21st Century], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 4 (2001), 37. No rank or affiliation is provided for the author.

³⁹ Qiao, “Haishang zhengba yibai Nnan,” 55.

⁴⁰ Tang, “Zhongguo haiyang weiquan zhanlue chutan,” 63.

⁴¹ “Zhongguo zhuquan burong qinfan” [Violations of China’s Sovereignty Will Not Be Tolerated], *Jiefangjun Bao*, April 6, 2001, 1.

⁴² *Renmin Ribao*, April 6, 2001.

⁴³ Tang, “Zhongguo haiyang weiquan zhanlue chutan.”

⁴⁴ See, for example, Oing; and Xu.

⁴⁵ Zhang Gang, “Dongnanya haishang tongdao anquan yu daguo boyi” [The Security of Southeast Asia’s SLOCs and the Great Power Game], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 7 (2006), 33. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

⁴⁶ *Jiefangjun Bao*, “Maliujia anliu yongdong” [Undercurrents in the Malacca Strait], July 26, 2004, 11.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Wang Zhicheng, “Haidao changjue Maliujia” [Pirates Are Rampaging in the Malacca Strait], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 9 (2004), 38. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

⁴⁸ Han Ding, “Maliujia qiandong riben mingan shenjing” [The Malacca Strait Is Hitting a Sensitive Nerve in Japan], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 5 (2000), 18. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

⁴⁹ Chen Angang and Wuming, “Mei yu zai Maliujia haixia bushu jundui” [America Is Trying to Deploy Troops in the Malacca Strait], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 7 (2004), 58. No ranks or affiliations are given for the authors.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Zhang Gang, “Dongnanya haishang tongdao anquan yu daguo boyi,” 35.

⁵² Wu Daihai, “Meiguoren zujue Jinlanwan nan ruyi” [America Is Having a Hard Time Getting Its Way in Leasing the Jinlan Bay], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 4 (2002), 5. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

⁵³ Shi Ping and Si Ping, “Meiguo haijun yanhou quanzhan” [America Surveys All Vital Shipping Choke Points], *Dangdai Haijun*, nos. 5, 6 (1996), and no. 1 (1997). No ranks or affiliations are given for the authors.

⁵⁴ Han Asade, trans. Long Dongxiao, “Zai Yinduyang jianli xin de zhanlue pingheng” [Create a New Strategic Balance in the Indian Ocean], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 7 (2001), 15. The author is a Senior Captain in Pakistan’s navy.

⁵⁵ Sun Tunda, “Jinglue haiyang” [Planning and Managing the Ocean], *Jiefangjun Bao*, November 14, 1995, 6.

⁵⁶ Li Zhenglun et al., “Yindu haijun shixian xiang yuandong gongjixing zhuanhua” [India’s Navy is Realizing Its Shift Toward Being Able to Attack in the Far East], *Jiefangjun Bao*, August 2, 1994, 4.

⁵⁷ Hai Yun, “Riyin chengle haishang zhanlue huoban” [Japan and India Have Become Strategic Partners in the Ocean], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 9 (2001), 7. No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

⁵⁸ Kemo, Sikete A, trans. Niu Junxiao, “MeiYin liangguo haijun haoshang la!” [The American and Indian Navies Are Growing Fond of Each Other!], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 6 (2002), 20.

⁵⁹ Hai.

⁶⁰ *Jiefangjun Bao*, “Maliujia anliu yongdong” [Undercurrents in the Malacca Strait], July 26, 2004, 11.

⁶¹ Gao Xinsheng, “Zhongguo haifang fazhan mianlin de zhuyao tiaozhan yu duice” [The Main Challenges and Answers to the Development of China’s Maritime Defense and Policy Countermeasures], *Guofang*, no. 11 (2005), 62. The author is from the Shenyang Artillery Academy, Basic Maritime Defense Tactics Teaching and Research Office (沈阳炮兵学院基础部海防战术教研室).

⁶² *Jiefangjun Bao*, “Yindu tuijin yuanhai jianmie de xin zhanlue” [India Pushes a New Strategy of Destroying the Enemy in Distant Seas], November 9, 2005, 12.

⁶³ *Jiefangjun Bao*, “Hangmu youyixia de Yatai zhanlue qiji” [Asia’s Strategic Chessboard of Aircraft Carriers], July 20, 2005, 9.

⁶⁴ Zhang Gang, “Dongnanya haishang tongdao anquan yu daguo boyi,” 35.

⁶⁵ Du Chaoping and Liang Guihua, “Yindu xin jian yuandong zhanlue fangyu jidi” [India Builds a New Far Eastern Strategic Defense Base] *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 4 (2004), 26. No ranks or affiliations are given for the authors.

⁶⁶ Qiao Lin, “Haishang maoyizhan bainian sikao” [Thinking About One Hundred Years of Trade Wars on the Oceans], *Dangdai Haijun*, no. 4 (1999). No rank or affiliation is given for the author.

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⁷⁴ Wang Shumei et al., “Luxing jundui liushi shiming shuli kexue haiquanguan” [Carry Out the Historic Mission of the Army and Establish the Scientific Concept of Sea Right], *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, no. 2 (2007), 141. The author is a postdoctoral fellow at the Academy of Military Sciences.

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⁷⁸ Wang Shumei et al., “Luxing jundui liushi shiming shuli kexue haiquanguan,” 142.

The Chinese Navy

Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles



This timely and superbly edited book contains uniformly informative and well-written essays addressing one of the most important issues in the present-day international arena and the primary, long-term issue facing U.S. national security: the challenges posed by a growing, modernizing China. *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles* is a work that addresses all aspects of the role played by China's navy in Beijing's current accomplishments and future intentions. It is that rare collection of essays by different authors that richly deserves reading from cover to cover.

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China's rise and the new international equities it is creating are nowhere more apparent than in the expanding capabilities and activities of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The contributors and editors of *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles* reach well beyond simply counting hardware to bring analytical sunshine into this crowded field. They explore the development of this increasingly global force, reaching well beyond military factors, to show the dynamic interactions of internal pressures, historic factors, geographic realities, technological changes, and doctrinal influences to provide the reader with a framework to organize observations and analysis. The insights here will prove valuable not only to maritime strategists, but to every American concerned with the course of Asian and world events.

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