Author: Taylor Fravel

Measuring Military Modernization

The U.S-China Security and Economic Review Commission (USCC) recently published a staff research paper entitled “Indigenous Weapons Development in China’s Military Modernization” that generated a great deal of media attention. One story noted that the report showed how the United States had “missed the emergence of significant military developments” and was “blinded by Beijing.” Another reportconcluded from the paper that “the United States has underestimated the growth of China’s military.”

What did the paper actually say?  It examined the development of four weapons systems: the Yuan-class (Type 041) diesel-powered submarine, the SC-19 anti-satellite missile, the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, and the J-20 aircraft. Reviewing U.S. analysis of these development of these systems, the paper concluded that “there are no universal trends in publicly reported U.S. government analysis on the development of indigenous Chinese weapon systems.” According to the paper, only the emergence of the Yuan-class submarine was unexpected.  As for the other systems, the paper’s main contention is that analysts miscalculated the speed or rate of the development of these systems, but not their emergence.

The actual claims of the USCC paper are much more modest and mixed than media coverage would indicate. Most importantly, as the USCC notes but doesn’t emphasize, the degree to which the appearance of theYuan-class submarine in 2004 was a surprise remains contested. The USCC paper suggests that the U.S. missed this program because it wasn’t mentioned in the Pentagon’s 2003 annual report on Chinese military power. However, the 2002 version of this same Pentagon report clearly stated that “A new advanced version of the SONG-class conventional submarine is expected to incorporate advanced air-independent propulsion.” The Pentagon may not have provided the name of the class as we now know it, but it didn’t miss the development of a new submarine with the characteristics of the Yuan boats (which shares some design similarities with the Song).  Thus, the strongest example supporting the USCC paper’s criticism of analysis of the Chinese military in the United States is wanting.

As for assessments of the pace of weapons development, many U.S. government analysts and military officers have stated that development of the DF-21D was faster than expected.  Nevertheless, the system isn’t yet operational.  Adm. Willard stated in December 2010 that the development of the DF-21D had reached something equivalent to what the U.S. military defines as “initial operational capability.” The following month, however, another senior naval official noted that although the progress that had been achieved, the PLA wasn’t yet capable of “effectively employing the system” because it had not yet conducted a test over open water or been integrated into the force.

Other claims about such miscalculations are accurate, but perhaps not as consequential as the USCC paper and subsequent media coverage indicate. To start, the USCC paper acknowledges that the U.S. government accurately assessed the development of China’s anti-satellite missile. Instead, the paper’s claim is that analysts outside of government missed the mark. Still, the U.S. government didn’t overlook the emergence of this system or its development.

As for the J-20, the paper notes that progress has been slightly faster than originally estimated. In 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates remarked that China wouldn’t have a fifth-generation fighter until 2020. The following year, the U.S. revised its estimate for operational deployment to 2018.  The first prototype was launched a year earlier than the U.S. government expected in 2011, not 2012.  Nevertheless, the U.S. government has been tracking the development of the aircraft since 1997. Over the course of two decades of development, such miscalculations are not as great or dangerous as it might seem.

To be sure, China’s unwillingness to share information about its weapons programs is a major factor affecting assessments of their development. Such unwillingness is par for the course in any competitive relationship.

Yet, other reasons for the miscalculations cited by the paper are probably exaggerated.  The paper claims that analysts have underestimated “the extent of changes in the Chinese defense industry in the 1990s and early 2000s.” But back in 2005, analysts at RAND published a report using open sources that noted the progress that China had achieved in reforming its defense-industrial base precisely during this period.  Similarly, noted PLA expert Tai Ming Cheung documented these reforms in a 2009 book, Fortifying China. (Read this summary of Cheung’s findings.)  Neither publication, however, was cited by the USCC paper.

In addition, the paper claims that China’s threat perceptions have been systematically underestimated. In particular, the paper notes that analysts “may have failed to fully appreciate the extent to which the Chinese leadership views the United States as a fundamental threat to China’s security.” Yet the 2005 RAND report made exactly this point, noting in a subheading that “the PLA Leadership Perceives United States as Greatest Threat.” Drawing on open sources, Larry Wortzel (a USCC commissioner) came to a similar conclusion in a 2007 study: “China’s leaders and military thinkers see the United States as a major potential threat to the PLA and China’s interests.”

Finally, the severity of analytical failures can only be determined by understanding the degree of success. Apart from the anti-satellite missile, the paper doesn’t examine any indigenously systems whose development was accurately assessed. On this score, the U.S. government appears to have some important successes, especially regarding strategic weapons.

Take, for example, the DF-31 series of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Pentagon noted in 2000 that “China…is designing a new generation of solid-fuel, road-mobile ICBMs,” and in 2002 that “deployment of the DF-31 should begin before mid-decade.” The Pentagon reported in 2006 that the missile had reached “initial threat availability” and in 2008 that it had been deployed to operational units.

Similarly, the Pentagon appears to have predicted quite accurately the development of China’s short and medium-range ballistic missiles. In a 1997 report on China’s military capabilities, the Pentagon estimated that China would have “the industrial capacity” to “as many as a thousand” such missiles. In its 2008 report to Congress, the Pentagon stated that the PLA had deployed “between 990 and 1,070” short-range ballistic missiles. In short, they nailed it.

The USCC staff research paper usefully draws attention to the challenges that analysts face when seeking track weapons development in China, a country that doesn’t seek to share such information. Further exploitation of Chinese-language open sources will certainly help improve future analysis. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn in the media can’t be sustained by the paper, which itself deserves close scrutiny.

[This originally appeared on The Diplomat.]

Investigating the Chinese Threat

Yesterday, I testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee — the first time that I had ever appeared before a Congressional committee.

As for the purpose of the hearing, the title says it all:  “Investigating the Chinese Threat, Part One: Military and Economic Aggression.”  Topics addressed included the military modernization, cyber espionage, and trade policies, among others.

My testimony examined China’s recent behavior in the South China Sea, a topic that I’ve been writing a lot about lately.

As a witness, I was asked to prepare and submit a written statement, of any length.  During the hearing, however, I only had five minutes to speak.  For an academic used to lecturing for 50 minutes several times a week, that is the equivalent of asking a chef to cook without salt.

The other witnesses were Dean Cheng, John Tkacik, and Larry Wortze, all, as it turns out, past or present employees of the Heritage Foundation.

 

 

All Quiet in the South China Sea (for now)

I just published a short piece on the South China Sea on the Foreign Affairs website.

In the piece, I argue that China, for now, has adopted a more moderate approach to managing its claims in this dispute.  In particular, China seeks to restore its tarnished image in East Asia and to reduce the rationale for a more active US role in the region.  China’s more moderate approach in the South China Sea provides further evidence that China will seek to avoid the type of confrontational policies that it had adopted toward the United States in 2010.

Read “All Quiet in the South China Sea: Why China is Playing Nice (For Now)“

Clarification of China’s Claims in the South China Sea?

Ambiguity about the extent of China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea has been a key source of concern in this dispute.  In the 1990s, China issued a series of domestic laws detailing its maritime claims under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, including 12 nautical mile territorial seas and 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ). Nevertheless, Chinese maps continue to contain a “nine-dashed line” around the South China Sea. The line first appeared on an official map produced by the Republic of China in 1947.  After 1949, China continued to use the line on its official maps, but never defined what the line included or excluded.

In a recent press conference, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to take an important step towards clarifying China’s claims in the South China Sea – and suggesting what the line might not mean.

First, the spokesperson, Hong Lei, distinguished between disputes over “territorial sovereignty of the islands and reefs of the Spratly Islands” and disputes over maritime demarcation. This affirms past statements, including a note to the United Nations in May 2011, that China will advance maritime claims that are consistent and compliant with UNCLOS. Under UNCLOS, states may only claim maritime rights such as an EEZ from land features like a nation’s coastline or its islands.

Second, and more importantly, the spokesperson further stated that “No country including China has claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.”  By making such a statement, this phrase suggests that the “nine-dashed line” doesn’t represent a claim to maritime rights (such as historic rights), much less a claim to sovereignty over the water space enclose by the line.  More likely, the line indicates a claim to the islands, reefs and other features that lie inside.

To be sure, China could advance a large claim to maritime rights in the South China Sea from the islands and other features in the Spratly Islands. Although UNCLOS only permits states to claim a 200 nautical mile EEZ from islands that can sustain permanent human habitation, sovereignty over a single island can generate an EEZ of approximately 125,000 nautical miles.

Nevertheless, even articulation of a large but UNCLOS-compliant claim would offer several advantages in terms of dispute resolution.  It would clarify where China’s EEZ claims from islands in the South China Sea overlap with the claims of littoral states from their coastlines.  As a result, disputed and undisputed areas would be clearly identified.  It would also allow states to invoke the dispute settlement mechanisms of UNCLOS, Part XV, which would a negotiated settlement to overlapping claims.

Of course, this recent statement doesn’t represent a full and complete definition of the nine-dashed line.  Nevertheless, it does at least rule out one possible definition and provide an opportunity for other states to press China to further clarify its position.

 [This post originally appeared on The Diplomat]

The Chinese Army Today

I have just received my copy of the second edition of Dennis Blasko’s The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (2nd edition).  For anyone interested in the modernization of China’s armed forces, this book is a “must read.”

The revised edition of The Chinese Army Today has many strengths:

First, the book examines the modernization of China’s ground forces.  Despite the emphasis in current commentary on China’s air and especially naval forces, China’s military remains heavily-dominated by its ground forces, where significant modernization is occurring.  Moreover, these forces play an important role not just in external defense and potential power projection, but also in a variety of domestic missions, including disaster relief and internal security.

Second, the book examines all aspects of China’s army, from doctrine and organization to equipment and training.

Third, the book is ruthlessly based on facts and informed analysis, not speculation.  The author, Dennis Blasko, is a retired U.S. army officer who has spent much of his career studying China’s armed forces and served as an attache in both Beijing and Hong Kong in the 1990s.

 

Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, and Military Strategy

In this article from the latest issue of Asian Security, I examine the sources of the PLA’s new emphasis on nonwar military operations (not to be confused with “military operations than war” or MOOTW in U.S. doctrine).  In particular, I explore why China’s armed forces have sought to strengthen their ability to conduct noncombat operations, especially domestic ones, even though China’s military modernization for traditional combat operations is far from complete.

I argue that the rise of noncombat operations in China’s military strategy is principally a response to internal threats to regime security that are a byproduct of rapid economic growth.  Although growth is key to the legitimacy of leaders in developing countries, it also creates new sources of domestic unrest and increases the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks, both of which, if unchecked, can harm future growth. As a result, developing countries such as China may use their armed forces to maintain political stability and provide services that the state lacks, such as emergency disaster relief.

This growing role of noncombat operations in China’s military strategy and operations is important for several reasons:

  • It demonstrates the continued domestic role for China’s armed forces, which includes the PLA, whose principal mission is external defense, and the paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP) charged with maintaining internal stability.
  • It indicates that the principal effect of economic growth has not been to identify expansive interests overseas that require new capabilities for offensive operations and long-range combat power projection for their protection. Instead, it has reinforced China’s interest in maintaining a stable external environment abroad and, more importantly, in ensuring domestic stability at home.
  • It suggests that the PLA may be devoting fewer resources to long-range power projection than it otherwise might and that such capabilities will grow at a slower rate than they otherwise would.

In addition, the relationship between regime insecurity and military strategy has implications for the study of international relations:

  • It identifies a new causal pathway through which domestic politics can influence the goals and content of a state’s military strategy, especially in the developing world.
  • It offers an alternative perspective on the relationship between rising powers and the likelihood of armed conflict, focusing on how rapid growth creates new rationales for bolstering internal security and other domestic operations such as disaster relief.

 

 

Chinese Foreign Policy syllabus

I have just re-tooled my Chinese foreign policy syllabus for an undergraduate lecture course on the topic.

Like most academic tasks, revising this syllabus was much more time-consuming than I had anticipated.  Moreover, there are never enough lectures to cover all the topics that need to be addressed.  Nevertheless, this version seeks to cover both China’s foreign relations during the Cold War as well as its grand strategy since the end of the Cold War.

Check out the syllabus.

China-North Korea Dossier

Adam Cathcart, a professor of history at Pacific Lutheran University in Washington, edits a terrific blog on China and North Korea, sinonk.com.

The site contains a great deal of Chinese and Korean language materials that are translated into English and analyzed.

One recent post stands out: a “dossier” of materials from the Chinese language press on how the leadership in Beijing responded to the death of Kim Jong Il.  The .pdf file includes 23 documents, including several analytical pieces.

Check it out here: China-North Korea Dossier No. 1: “China and the North Korean Succession”

China’s Quest for Natural Resources

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a body which Congress created in 2000, has started a new round of hearings.

Typically, each hearing examines a particular dimension of China’s international activity and any security implications for the United States.

The most recent hearing, held yesterday, explores China’s thirst for natural resources.  In particular, the hearing focused on water, hydrocarbons and minerals, and fishing featured a number of prominent exports, including Elizabeth Economy from the Council on Foreign Relations, Mikkal Herberg from the National Bureau of Asian Research, and Lyle Goldstein from the Naval War College.

The written testimonies can be downloaded here.

China in Africa: The Real Story

Deborah Brautigam, author of the detailed and informative book The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, has an equally terrific and informative blog.

Similarly entitled China in Africa: The Real Story, she covers China’s growing role in Africa — a great resource for those interested in these issues.  As she writes, “This blog takes up where that book left off.”

Hat tip to Bill Bishop for letting me about this blog.