For the Maritime Awareness Project, I examine how three recent fishing disputes between China and Indonesia prompted China to clarify its claims to historic rights. Read more
Category: China
How China Will Respond to the Tribunal
I have written a short piece for the South China Morning Post, which outlines how China may react to the arbitral tribunal’s award next week.
I make three points: Read more
China’s Nuclear Strategy
In a new article in International Security, Fiona Cunningham and I examine whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture.
We reach three conclusions: Read more
Strategic Deterrence and China’s Military Parade
As the thoughtful discussion on ChinaFile notes, the upcoming military review is designed to serve several different purposes. The actual military purpose of the parade, however, should not be overlooked. Read more
China’s New Military Strategy
In a new article in the China Brief, I show that terminology in the 2015 defense white paper indicates that China has officially changed its national military strategy. The goal of the new strategy is “winning informationized local wars,” with an emphasis on the maritime domain.
This marks only the ninth military strategy that China has adopted since the founding of the PRC in 1949 and will guide the PLA’s approach to modernization in the coming decade.
To read the article, point your browsers here
Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region
Last week, the Carnegie Endowment issued a strategic net assessment of the Asia-Pacific region that I and many others contributed to writing.
The report takes a long view, looking out over the next 5-25 years, and outlines five possible futures that range for more cooperative to more conflictual outcomes as well as recommendations for avoiding the most dangerous outcomes.
Chinese Sources and Chinese Strategy
Last week, James Holmes on RealClearDefense published a critique of my article with Chris Twomey on China’s counter-intervention strategy.
Our response was published today here.
The Myth of China’s Counter-intervention Strategy
Chris Twomey and I have just published an article in The Washington Quarterly on Chinese military strategy.
Increasingly, journalists, policy analysts and scholars as well as selected U.S. government documents describe China as pursuing a ”counter-intervention” strategy to forestall the U.S. ability to operate in a regional conflict. Moreover, the concept of counter-intervention (fan ganyu) is attributed to the writings of Chinese strategits, as a China’s own version of an anti-access / area denial strategy
Nevertheless, as we show in the article, China does not actually use the term counter-intervention to describe its own military strategy, much less a broader grand strategic goal to oppose the role of the United States in regional affairs. When Chinese sources do refer to related concepts such as “resisting” or “guarding against” intervention, they are describing as one of the many subsidiary components of campaigns and contingencies that have more narrow and specific goals, especially a conflict over Taiwan.
This misunderstanding or misreading of China’s military strategy is consequential for several reasons: it overstates the U.S. role in Chinese military planning, it can divert analysis from other aspects of China’s military modernization and it exacerbates the growing security dilemma between the United States and China.
The article can be downloaded here
U.S. Policy in the South China Sea
I recently published a short policy brief for the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University that examines the evolution of U.S. policy toward the disputes in the South China Sea since 1995.
Here’s the executive summary:
U.S. policy toward the disputes in the South China Sea has four features. First, the United States has altered its policy in response to changes in the level of tensions in the dispute. Second, U.S. policy toward the South China Sea has been premised on the principle of maintaining neutrality regarding the conflicting claims to sovereignty. Third, as its involvement in managing tensions has increased, the United States has emphasised the process and principles by which claims should be pursued more than the final outcome or resolution of the underlying disputes, especially conflict management through the conclusion of a binding code of conduct between ASEAN and China. Fourth, U.S. policy in the South China Sea has sought to shape China’s behaviour in the South China Sea by highlighting the costs of coercion and the pursuit of claims that are inconsistent with customary international law. Looking forward, the involvement of the United States in seeking to manage tensions in the South China Sea is likely to continue so long as the territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes remain unresolved and states take declaratory steps and operational actions to assert and defend their claims.
Read the full report here.
China’s Dispute with Vietnam
Yesterday, I answered some questions from the NYT’s Edward Wong on the standoff between China and Vietnam over China’s deployment of an oil rig in the South China Sea.
Click here for all the details.