
Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan's Democratization

M. TAYLOR FRAVEL

Nowhere has the role of civil-military relations in democratic consolidation been more important than in the case of Taiwan. After retreating from the mainland in 1949, the Kuomintang (KMT) government suspended key elements of the constitution, relied on the military to maintain internal security through martial law, and staffed active duty generals in key positions within the domestic administration. In 1986, President Chiang Ching-kuo's decision to lift martial law the following year, as well as his decision to end the ban on opposition political parties, marked the start of Taiwan's transition toward democracy that ended ten years later with the popular election of Lee Teng-hui as president.¹ During this period of political change, the military remained a potent force in domestic politics, as it had enjoyed considerable organizational and political autonomy for almost forty years. The appointment of Hau Pei-tsun as premier in 1990, which came just six months after he resigned as Taiwan's top general, signaled to many a continued role for the military in domestic politics and sparked some of the worst demonstrations of transition.

Yet despite the legacy of martial law and military autonomy, Taiwan's transition to democracy occurred without overt resistance from the armed forces through a coup d'état or other action. In 1996, Hau's presidential bid fell flat, lacking both KMT and popular support. Moreover, in 2000, voters elected Chen Shui-bian, the first president from the opposition party previously repressed by the military under martial law. Although central to Taiwan's political development, civil-

M. TAYLOR FRAVEL is a Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Stanford University. *Address for correspondence:* The Center for International Security and Cooperation, Encina Hall, 2nd Floor, Stanford, CA 94305. E-mail: taylor.fravel@stanford.edu

military relations have never been treated as an independent variable that explains this successful democratization by any of the key scholarly works on the island's democratization.² Indeed, the most intriguing part of the Taiwan story—why the military did not revolt or openly resist during the democratic transition—remains untold.

To explain Taiwan's transformation, this article starts with the notion of civilian supremacy. In general terms, civilian supremacy expands Huntington's concept of objective civilian control.³ As conceptualized by Aguero, Diamond, Hunter, and others, the achievement of civilian supremacy requires that three conditions must be reached: first, military intervention in domestic politics must be eliminated so that the armed forces are rendered neutral as a political force; second, political institutions must exist to ensure control of the armed forces by an elected government; and third, society must be free from military intervention in both the civil and the economic spheres, thereby rebuilding trust both in the armed forces and in the government.⁴

Under martial law, Taiwan lacked civilian supremacy over the military. While the KMT exerted a degree of civilian control over the armed forces through a commissar system, the military remained an active force in politics and society through the implementation of martial law. Since 1987, however, Taiwan has made considerable progress toward achieving civilian supremacy. The armed forces have largely withdrawn from the domestic political sphere, as active duty military officers no longer serve in the civilian government and the military no longer oversees internal security. The passage of the National Defense Law in 2000 and the growing oversight role of the Legislative Yuan have strengthened the institutions of democratic control. Reconciliation efforts for past abuses by the armed forces and the elimination of mandatory military education programs have increased social impartiality.

Four factors explain Taiwan's progress towards civilian supremacy. First, the legacy of civilian government administration and KMT control of Taiwan's military created optimal preconditions by buffering opposition of the military to political change. Second, the existence of a compelling external threat to Taiwan's national security from China during the transition helped to unite the political objectives of the military and the civilian government. Third, skilled leadership by presidents Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui navigated around potential military opposition by deferring key reforms until after the transition had begun. Fourth, emerging democratic institutions, especially the legislature and the press, helped exert public pressure on the

government to reform the armed forces, ensuring a broad base of support.

What follows has three parts. The first section reviews the state of civil military relations before the lifting of martial law and the initiation of Taiwan's transition to democracy. The second section examines the striking progress towards the establishment of civilian supremacy over the military since 1987, discussing in turn political neutrality, democratic control, and social impartiality. The third section covers the sources of these changes.

Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan under Martial Law

During the era of martial law, Taiwan lacked civilian supremacy over the military. While the Koumintang (KMT) exerted a degree of civilian control over the armed forces through a political commissar system, the military still remained an active force in both politics and society. The state of civil-military relations in Taiwan under martial law is summarized in Table 1.

Under martial law, the military was actively involved in domestic politics and was anything but a neutral political force. Through the 1950s, military officers occupied leading positions in the civilian government. For example, after 1949, General Ch'en Ch'eng, one of Chiang Kai-shek's trusted deputies, dominated the civilian administration of Taiwan until 1963, serving as vice-president, premier, and vice director-general of the KMT. Until 1972, a senior military officer served as governor of Taiwan Province,⁵ and military officers, both active duty and retired, constituted roughly 30 percent of the Central Standing Committee (CSC) of the KMT, the key policy committee of the party.⁶ Military membership on the CSC dropped to roughly twenty percent in the 1970s, but the informal influence of military officers increased, as many colonels and generals passed special examinations that placed them in government posts upon retirement from the armed forces.⁷ Perhaps the most significant encroachment by the military into politics occurred through General Wang Sheng, who was head of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) and viewed as "the second most powerful political figure in Taiwan after Chiang himself" in the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁸ Wang, held to represent the hardline faction of the KMT, simultaneously headed the GPWD and the "Liu Shao-kang" office, which played a leading role in policymaking.⁹

As the defender of the KMT, the military played an active role in domestic administration. Through the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC),

Table 1

Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan, 1949-1987

	Indicator	Status
POLITICAL NEUTRALITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loyalty to the constitution, even if changed • No appointment of active duty officers <i>and</i> limited involvement of retired officers in civilian government • No involvement in selection of government officials, elected or appointed • No involvement in formulation and administration of domestic policy, especially internal security • Clear and defined external security mission • Professional military culture • Forces broadly representative of society at rank levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loyalty to the KMT and Chiangs, not government • 20 percent to 30 percent military membership on KMT Central and Standing Committees • Senior domestic posts filled by active and retired officers • Participation in vote-mobilization efforts and official appointment process • Extensive involvement in domestic politics through the martial law institutions of the Taiwan Garrison Command and National Security Council • Explicit internal security mission of suppression of communist rebellion and opposition to regime • Growth of professionalism in 70s and 80s • Officer corps dominated by mainlanders, not Taiwanese

Table 1 (cont.)**DEMOCRATIC
CONTROL**

- Constitutional supremacy of chief executive as commander-in-chief
- Management and supervision of the military by executive agencies
- Legislative oversight and monitoring
- Civilian expertise in security affairs
- Internal autonomy of the military

**SOCIAL
IMPARTIALITY**

- Reconciliation and healing for past abuses
- “Demilitarization” of culture
- Transparency of military activities

- Constitutional separation, but overruled by the Temporary Provisions
- Two-track system whereby Chief of the General Staff reported directly to the president, not the EY
- Effectively none, due to the lack of opposition representation in Legislative Yuan
- No civilian research centers or experts
- Extensive KMT political commissar system within all of the armed forces
- Silence on 2-28 and “White Terror”
- Mandatory military education program in all schools
- Military ownership of media assets
- Most information highly classified

which was established in 1950 and staffed with more than 25,000 personnel, the military was entrusted with the implementation of martial law and the maintenance of domestic political order. The TGC had authority to censor and shut down publications, control entry and exit into the country, spy on dissidents, try and imprison political prisoners, and supervise the civilian police force. Under martial law, political dissidents were tried, convicted, and sentenced by military courts, often without legal representation.¹⁰ In 1967, Chiang Kai-shek established the National Security Council as a supreme policymaking body, thereby circumventing the Executive Yuan (EY) and Legislative Yuan (LY).¹¹ A serving general always chaired the NSC, which had responsibility for intelligence gathering and supervising local elections. The military was also particularly effective at mobilizing “iron votes” in support of the KMT through local commanders and the Veterans Affairs Commission.¹²

As noted above, under martial law, the KMT established a tradition of partial civilian control over the armed forces through a commissar system. The Chief of the General Staff (CGS), the highest-ranking military officer, reported directly to the president, not to the premier. Just as martial law provisions suspended term limits for civilians, KMT control of the military institutionalized personal control over the armed forces by the Chiangs. After retreating to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek entrusted his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to establish a commissar system and oversee the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) in order to ensure the army’s loyalty to the KMT and increase military discipline, two factors blamed in part for the loss to the communists on the mainland.¹³ Reflecting this close relationship between the party and the army, the official insignia of the armed forces was the same as the KMT’s until 1989.¹⁴

The sustained period of martial law, and the oppressive role played by the armed forces, limited the development of a democratic political culture. The memory of the 2-28 incident, when the army massacred at least 10,000 Taiwanese in February 1947 in reaction to a series of protests and demonstrations against the mainland government, symbolized the view of the KMT as ruthless invaders.¹⁵ The subsequent repression of political dissent by the TGC generated widespread resentment of the military, mistrust of government institutions, and an atmosphere of fear. Under martial law, around 20,000 people were imprisoned for political crimes and another 5,000 were executed.¹⁶ The GPWD also conducted “allegiance warfare,” a political socialization effort designed to build support for the KMT and its objectives.¹⁷

Military training offices were established in schools and universities at all levels to implement mandatory military education that also included political lessons to build support for the KMT. In addition, the military constructed a network of newspapers, radio stations, film studios, and publishing houses to spread its message to the civilian population.¹⁸

Civil-Military Relations Under Democratic Consolidation

Since 1987, Taiwan has made considerable progress toward achieving civilian supremacy over the military, which is summarized in Table 2. The armed forces have largely withdrawn from domestic politics, as active duty military officers no longer serve in the civilian government and the military itself no longer supervises internal security, including police work and censorship. The passage of the National Defense Law in 2000 along with the enhanced oversight role of the Legislative Yuan has further institutionalized democratic control of the military. Likewise, the need for reconciliation for past abuses has been recognized, with limited efforts to recognize and compensate past victims.

Political Neutrality of the Military

Political neutrality of the armed forces is defined as the absence of military participation in spheres of politics outside the limited domain of national defense policy. In most cases, the absence of political neutrality refers to the degree of involvement in “spheres deemed to be civilian,” usually internal security, intelligence, or other domestic policymaking arenas.¹⁹ In the ideal case, the armed forces exhibit total neutrality from politics, reflecting the military professionalism described by Huntington. Indicators of neutrality include the declared loyalty of the armed forces to the civilian system of government, a withdrawal from the formulation and implementation of domestic policy, the absence of influence in the selection of government officials, the existence of a well-defined external mission and the military’s withdrawal from political parties.²⁰

Loyalty. When former Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Hau Pei-sun became premier in 1990, the loyalty of the military to any democratic civilian government was uncertain. Hau had appointed 75 percent of the generals then on active duty and represented the conservative faction of the KMT, which opposed further political liberalization.²¹ In October 1992, for example, Premier Hau suggested that the military would oppose Taiwan independence, even if it occurred through a

Table 2**Current Status of Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan, 1987-2000**

	Indicator	Status
POLITICAL NEUTRALITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loyalty to the constitution, even if changed • No appointment of active officers <i>and</i> limited involvement of retired officers to civilian government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repeated declarations of loyalty to the constitution • Membership on KMT Central and Standing Committees by active officers eliminated and by retired generals reduced to < 5 percent (1993) • Dominance in EY of retired generals in MND, NSC and NSB positions • Retired generals serve as special advisors to the president
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No involvement in selection of government officials, elected or appointed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isolated rumors of vote-mobilization activities
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No involvement in formulation and administration of domestic policy, especially internal security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elimination of internal security role, except the Coast Guard (1992) • Political Warfare Dept of MND maintains right to wire-tap
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear and defined external security mission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explicit internal security mission focused on defending the island against potential PRC missile attack or invasion (1992?)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Professional military culture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of training programs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forces broadly representative of society at rank levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taiwanese Chief of the General Staff appointed (1999) • Officer corps increasingly representative of society

Table 2 (cont.)

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitutional supremacy of chief executive as commander-in-chief • Management and supervision of the military by executive agencies • Legislative oversight and monitoring • Civilian expertise in security affairs • Internal autonomy of the military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition by the military of president as commander-in-chief (1996) • Establishment of NSC as key policy advisory body for national security (1994) • Passage of National Defense Law (2000) • Passage of Defense Ministry Organization Law (2000) • Monitoring by LY through National Defense Committee (1992) • Regular interpolations of Defense Minister and MND staff (1992) • Limited interpellation of Chief of the General Staff (1998) • Authority limited by system of rotation, lack of staff expertise and lack of statute on information classification • Growing numbers of civilian research centers and defense experts • Elimination of formal party activities within the military (1993) • Freedom to make most day-to-day management decisions
SOCIAL IMPARTIALITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconciliation and healing for past abuses • “Demilitarization” of culture • Transparency of military activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public apology for 2-28 and legislation to compensate victims • Elimination of military education and allegiance warfare programs • Student protests against military human rights and treatment of conscripts • MND increasingly transparent, through National Defense Report and website

democratic referendum. In the Legislative Yuan (LY), Hau openly stated that "it is unthinkable that the commander of the three services of the armed forces of the ROC would take no action when seeing the name of the ROC being dropped."²²

Since then, however, the military has begun openly to express its loyalty to the civilian government. In September 1998, during the first interpellation of a Chief of the General Staff in the LY, Tang Fei stated that the military would defend the constitution, even if the constitution were changed from ROC to Taiwan.²³ The military has also repeatedly declared its loyalty to the president and its intention of maintaining political neutrality, as stated by defense minister Chiang Chung-ling in 1998.²⁴ An important demonstration of this loyalty occurred during the 2000 presidential election. Throughout the 1990s, the reaction of the military to the election of a presidential candidate from the KMT opposition was a litmus test of its loyalty to the democratic process. In March 2000, Chen Shui-bian, a long-time member of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), narrowly defeated James Soong to become the first non-KMT president in Taiwan's history. Significantly, even before the election, then CGS Tang Yiau-wing pledged "to the would-be commander-in-chief that the armed forces will be loyal...and defend the national security of the Republic of China."²⁵ Immediately following Chen's election, Tang similarly pledged the full loyalty and support of the military to the new president.

Involvement in domestic policy. While the appointment of active duty military officers to leadership posts in the civilian government has ceased, the military continues to play a limited policymaking role in the areas of national security policy. Active duty officers occupy midlevel positions within the national security bureaucracy, especially the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the NSC (National Security Council), and the National Security Bureau (NSB). For example, senior officers, including the head of each of the armed services, hold many executive positions in the MND.²⁶ In addition, retired officers remained actively involved in defense policy under the KMT throughout the 1990s. With only two exceptions since 1949, all defense ministers have been recently retired high-ranking military officers. The last defense minister, Tang Yiau-wing, served as CGS prior to assuming his current post. Likewise, the previous secretary-general of the NSC (Ying Tsung-wen), head of the NSB (Ting Yu-chou), and head of the Vocational Assistance Commission (Lee Chen-lin), are retired generals.²⁷ Finally, under the tenure of Lee Teng-hui, numerous active generals have been appointed as "special presidential advisors" or "strategic advisors" upon their retirement.²⁸

Selection of government officials. Throughout the 1990s, when the KMT was the ruling party, military participation in key policymaking committees dramatically declined, which has in turn greatly reduced military influence over the appointment and selection of civilian officials. Participation of military officers on the KMT Central Standing Committee (CSC) continued into the early 1990s. However, after the 14th party congress in 1993, active duty military officers were no longer selected as official KMT representatives,²⁹ and subsequent KMT leadership conferences have continued this trend.³⁰

With respect to involvement in elections, allegations of the military's role in "getting out the vote" have persisted throughout the 1990s. In 1994, DPP Deputy Secretary General Chiu Yi-jen accused the KMT of using military personnel to assist its candidates.³¹ In 1997, a New Party candidate from Matsu alleged that the military sought to influence local elections by threatening residents with lost business if they did not support the KMT.³² During the 2000 presidential elections, allegations have surfaced that the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) campaigned for Lien Chan, the KMT candidate, in military housing complexes.³³ Assessment of such allegations, however, is tricky. The involvement of the military in past elections suggests that such claims might be true. Yet, even if they are true, it is not clear whether they are undertaken as a matter of official policy or at the initiative of local commanders. Such allegations might also arise as part of the electoral campaign efforts to tarnish the KMT image. On balance, involvement in elections has probably been greatly reduced but not eliminated, and as the Matsu case suggests, likely continues in areas where military presence is large and has a sizable impact on the local economy.

Domestic policy implementation. The role of the military in the implementation of domestic policy has been largely eliminated. In 1987, the lifting of martial law ended involvement in censorship activities and the use of military courts to prosecute sedition and treason cases. In 1992, the disbandment of the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) formally ended the military's internal security role, with the civilian police administration assuming all policing responsibilities. In 1994, the NSC was reorganized as the president's chief advisory body for national security issues, not just internal security ones, and had been relied upon heavily by Lee Teng-hui to formulate national security policy. The NSB, the notorious intelligence bureau, was reorganized to focus on intelligence relevant to national security and placed under the authority of the NSC. In 1997, an official spokesman explained that the NSB

“maintains neutrality in the government, it does not involve itself in public security affairs and operates according to law.”³⁴

External mission. The military today possesses a clearly articulated, externally oriented mission of national defense. The *National Defense Report* states that “the ROC’s primary defense mission is to prevent the PRC from invading Taiwan by force and achieve military victory.”³⁵ While this statement might be dismissed as cheap talk, the Jingshi An, or streamlining program, adds credibility to such an external mission. Initiated in 1997, the Jingshi An focuses on downsizing the armed forces to create a more efficient force structure that relies on second and third generation weapons platforms. Through this program, the number of active duty soldiers will be reduced from 450,000 to 380,000.³⁶ Such troop reductions are necessary to purchase advanced weapons systems, such as Lafayette-class destroyers, Patriot missile batteries, and Mirage fighters, all of which are systems that support an external mission of national defense.

Party involvement. Elimination of formal KMT activities within the armed forces has increased the internal autonomy of the military. Article 139 of the Constitution prohibits any formal relationship between the military and a political party. In the months preceding the 14th Party Congress in the same year, KMT party units within the armed forces stopped collecting party dues, which led defense minister Sun Chen to declare that “political parties have withdrawn from the military.”³⁷ In October 1993, the LY passed the revised University Law, which prohibits political parties from establishing organizations in the military as well as in schools and courts.³⁸ More recently, the 2000 NDL reiterated the prohibition on military commanders that prevents them from encouraging their troops in any way to favor any particular political candidate.

Democratic Control of the Military

Democratic control is the capacity of the elected civilian government to formulate and implement the goals of the state, including national security and defense policy. Under democratic control, the elected government alone determines national security and defense policy, including the overall political objectives of the use of force and the decision to declare war. In addition, the government oversees the appointment of high-ranking military officers, formulates and approves the defense budget, determines the force structure, and defines the parameters of operational doctrine. Indicators of democratic control

include a constitutional foundation for civilian control, executive branch management of the armed forces, legislative oversight, and reliance on civilian defense experts in policymaking.

Constitutional foundations. In 1992, the abolition of the Temporary Provisions, which had been in force since 1948, revived the Republic of China's Constitution.³⁹ Article 36 gives the president supreme command authority over the armed forces, and Article 38 empowers him to declare war. Article 2 of the Additional Articles passed by the National Assembly in 1997 clarifies the supremacy of the president in national security policymaking by placing the NSC under his control. In January 2000, the passage of the National Defense Law (NDL) further strengthened the legal foundation of civilian control by stipulating that the national defense system consists of the president, National Security Council (NSC), Executive Yuan (EY), and Ministry of National Defense (MND). In particular, the NDL specifically empowers the EY to oversee national defense policy. The General Staff Headquarters (GSH) of the armed forces, which had previously played a dominant role, is conspicuously absent from this framework.

Executive branch management. Prior to the passage of the NDL and the Defense Ministry Organization Law (DMOL) in January 2000, Taiwan lacked an adequate institutional structure for democratic control of the military, which was split into two systems or *xitong*.⁴⁰ The military command system, or *junling xitong*, was managed by the GSH and led by the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), the highest-ranking military officer. The command system has responsibility for all major aspects of the armed forces, including military education, military training, mobilization of reserves, arms procurement and production, intelligence, strategy, troop deployment, and warfighting. As such, before 2000, it administers somewhere between 70 to 90 percent of the total military budget.⁴¹ The CGS, and the military command system under his control, reports directly to the president, circumventing the premier and EY as well as the LY. The pay grade of the CGS is equivalent to a Yuan president, placing him above the defense minister in bureaucratic rank.⁴² The military administration system, or *junzheng xitong*, is managed by the MND, with responsibility for national defense policy, budgeting, and regulations. The MND is part of the EY and, as a result, managed by the premier and supervised by the LY. In practice, even in the 1990s, the MND coordinated but did not supervise the interaction between the command system and the civilian government.⁴³

The net result of this institutional structure was considerable autonomy for the command system and thus most of the military. Because

the CGS and command system reported directly to the president, no formal institution existed through which the civilian government could supervise the armed forces. President Lee Teng-hui did convene a military affairs discussion committee, or *junshi huitan*, but this forum has been used largely to improve ties between the president and the senior commanders and lacks formal constitutional status. More importantly, although directly overseeing the armed forces, the Office of the President lacked the specialized personnel necessary to play this supervisory role. As a result, key decisions surrounding military doctrine, force structure, procurement, and budgeting originated within the command system and were overseen by the GSH.⁴⁴ While the MND presented the budget to the EY and LY for approval, it lacked the personnel to supervise the budgeting process. Rather, the MND merely coordinated the annual request as the key interface between the command system and the EY. The GSH, not the MND, supervised the budgeting process, which was linked to core areas of defense policy such as force structure and doctrine.⁴⁵ The GSH initiated the Jingshi An in 1997, which represented a major shift in doctrine and force structure, without even consulting the legislature.⁴⁶

Recognizing the problems generated by the autonomy of the command system, President Lee Teng-hui moved to establish a legal basis for civilian control. In March 1993, the EY instructed the MND to begin drafting a national defense law that would lay the constitutional foundation for democratic control. Drafting was not completed, however, until the end of 1997, due to deep disagreements over merging the command and administrative systems. In May 1998, the EY submitted draft legislation to the LY, which, after substantial revisions, passed the NDL and DMOL in January 2000.⁴⁷ The NDL stipulates that the defense minister must be a civilian and that the military orders pass from the president *through* the defense minister to the CGS. The DMOL integrates the military administration and command systems under the MND. Under this arrangement, the CGS is the chief military command advisor to the defense minister and directs the combined three services (army, navy, air force), which were demoted from general headquarters to commands. While the CGS maintains operational command, this authority is delegated by the defense minister, who in turn receives it directly from the president. The DMOL also created a number of departments, such as strategic planning and procurement, in order to assume functions of the command system.⁴⁸

Even before the passage of the NDL and DMOL, the EY had begun to place aspects of the command system under direct civilian authority.

In March 1998, following four years of procurement-related scandals, Premier Siew transferred the Military Procurement Bureau from the GSH to the MND, thereby placing it under civilian control. At the same time, the Zhongshan Institute of Science and Technology, the military research organization controlled by the GSH, was transferred to the MND.⁴⁹ Premier Siew also instructed the Ministry of Justice to lead an investigation of corruption in the military, which marked the first time that the MND and the armed forces were subjected to the authority of civilian investigators.

Legislative supervision. Under martial law, legislative oversight and monitoring of the military were moot, as no effective opposition existed. After the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections, however, legislative supervision has become an established part of the political process. In October 1992, the MND established a Legislative Affairs Office to handle legislators' inquiries.⁵⁰ A National Defense Committee in the LY monitors the armed forces and meets regularly with the defense minister to discuss the annual budget and national security threats, especially from the mainland. The NSB chief also appears, although usually only to answer questions about the budget.⁵¹ In March 1999, however, the NSB head appeared at the request of the DPP chairman of the committee, Chou Po-lun, to make a special report about national security intelligence work.⁵² Within the LY, open discussions of military affairs among legislators occur frequently. As a legislator, Chen Shui-bian made supervision of the military one of his key issues when he served in the LY. National defense conferences have been held by legislators to focus on procurement-related scandals and the treatment of conscripts.⁵³ Finally, and most importantly, the LY played a significant role in the drafting of the final versions of the NDL and DMOL. Legislative pressure helped influence the decision to integrate the command and administration systems under the MND, while the decision to demote the GPWD to a Political Warfare Office, with a greatly reduced personnel and budget, came from a DPP legislator.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, the legislature's oversight and monitoring role remains limited. First, before the passage of the NDL, the LY lacked a constitutional basis for supervising the command system and thus the majority of the military. The LY is empowered only to supervise the agencies within the EY, which, before the DMOL, excluded the command system. Despite legislative requests, only civilian officials from the MND would appear before the LY to answer questions and provide information. Under the DMOL, legislators should have increasing

access to officers and members of the command system, because the defense minister can instruct them to appear.

Second, the LY has often lacked the information to perform an effective supervisory function. More than 30 percent of 1998 military spending was classified as "hidden," which had been as high as 60 percent in the early 1990s.⁵⁵ Moreover, currently there is no statutory right of access by the LY or citizens to official government records and information, leaving such classifications at the discretion of the EY. While there have been closed door sessions on the military budget, the amount of classified information revealed remains discretionary.⁵⁶ Moreover, in these closed meetings, the MND provided only one detailed copy of the secret portions of the budget for legislators to consult, which could not be removed from the meeting room and thus prevented advance preparation for discussions of the military budget.⁵⁷ The implementation of the DMOL should improve the flow of information to the LY.

Third, the LY's committee system prevents the accumulation of expertise necessary for effective supervision. Legislative aides conduct all preparatory work for national defense committee meetings, as the committee itself has no permanent staff members. While some KMT and New Party members have military backgrounds, most DPP members do not, which further limits their supervisory ability. Legislators also may not bring aides into closed meetings when secret portions of the budget are discussed.⁵⁸ In addition, committee assignments are based on self-selective rotation, not tenure. Every six months, when a new meeting of the LY begins, committee assignments change, limiting the ability of members to build expertise in an area as complex as defense.

Fourth, the limited constitutional power of the LY prevents deeper legislative supervision of the military. Based on Article 70 of the Constitution, the LY cannot pass a budget that is higher than the one offered by the EY. In addition, the LY must act on the proposed budget within three months and relies upon the Control Yuan to perform all audits and analysis. If the LY opposes the EY's budget, the EY can force the LY to "reconsider" the bill, which requires a two-thirds majority to return the bill to the EY for revisions (Article 57), creating a high threshold for effective legislative action.⁵⁹

Civilian expertise. The lack of sufficient civilian expertise in national security and defense affairs also limits the establishment of civilian control. Only a limited number of nongovernmental research centers that focus on national security and defense have been identified by this author. The Council for Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS) has a

staff of approximately six and focuses on ROC-PRC issues, while the Peace and Strategy Research Center was recently established at Nanhua University. The Institute for National Policy Research, one of the leading domestic research organizations, does not appear to have any national security experts, but has begun to focus on the budgeting process, publishing a section on the military budget in a recent report.⁶⁰ As one expatriate Taiwanese scholar has written, “the government should abandon the old mentality that only soldiers should be concerned with defense affairs” and establish civilian positions in the MND and think-tanks such as the “Taiwan Institute for Defense Analysis.”⁶¹

Social Impartiality

The third pillar of civilian supremacy is social impartiality, defined as the total demilitarization of civil society to allow free reign of democratic principles and ideals. In regimes with a lengthy record of military involvement, either direct or indirect, the legacy of military rule or oppression can constrain the development of a democratic political culture by fostering fear, resentment, and a lack of trust in the institutions of government. The best indicators of social impartiality would come from public opinion surveys, asking specific questions about civilian views of the military and its role in society, but such a survey does not exist. What follows below, then, is a discussion of actions taken by the government to improve social impartiality.

Official reconciliation efforts. In the mid-1990s, the government began reconciliation efforts for past injustices conducted by the armed forces. In 1995, President Lee Teng-hui publicly apologized for the 2-28 incident, while the LY passed a law to compensate the victims. February 28 has been declared a national holiday and a memorial has been constructed to honor the victims. In May 1998, the LY passed a law to compensate the victims who had been imprisoned or executed under martial law. Significantly, the MND established and funded a foundation to dispense compensation, which paid the first claims in December 1999.⁶² Despite such efforts, resentment and distrust of the military, especially from people of Taiwanese descent, remain high. Taiwanese families often denigrate those who serve in the armed forces and whose status in society has steadily decreased as Taiwanization has increased. Marriage to an officer is held to be an insult, while those who willingly enroll in military academies are said not to have been smart enough to test into the civilian universities.⁶³

Demilitarization. A more permissive environment for criticizing the armed forces now exists, as demonstrated by the rise of civil movements that address military issues. After a string of weapons procurement scandals in the mid-1990s, pressure from legislators compelled the government to expedite the transfer of the Military Procurement Bureau from the GSH to the MND. Treatment of conscripts has sparked numerous protests and civil action groups, as the suicide rate among conscripts is twice the national average and as many as 500 soldiers per year die while on active duty. In 1998, students organized the first open protest against the military, when they demonstrated in support of human rights within the military. As a result of these activities, the MND established the Military Human Rights Commission in March 1999 to investigate charges of abuse of conscripts and work with victims' families. Numerous civic groups have also been formed by victims' families to lobby for increased protection.⁶⁴

In addition, the government has also taken steps to reduce the involvement of the military in political socialization efforts. In 1998, the Council of Grand Justices banned military education programs on school campuses, which hitherto had been mandatory, and thus removed the military's main tool for influencing society.⁶⁵ In January 2000, the NDL greatly reduced the role of the GPWD, reducing it to an office (not a headquarters) and limiting its functions to troop morale. At this time, however, it is unclear how media assets will be treated—throughout the 1990s, the MND continued to own 59 radio stations (51.4 percent of the total), 9 publishing houses, 30 printing presses, 2 public newspapers, 21 military publications, and 72 other publications.⁶⁶ While these assets are not currently used for domestic political warfare, they do represent a penetration by government into civil society and have the potential to play a political role, especially during elections.

Transparency. The transparency of military activities necessary for civilian oversight has increased dramatically. In 1992, the MND published its first white paper on national defense, which included information on threat assessment, doctrine, force structure, and budget. The report has been published three times since, the latest edition in 2000. In 1996, the MND began to hold weekly press conferences and established a website to distribute unclassified information, such as defense reports and press conference transcripts. In 1999, defense minister Tang Fei established a special investigation committee that includes elected representatives as well as members of victims' families in order to increase the transparency of the investigation process regarding peacetime deaths.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, transparency remains limited. First, the

absence of statutory guidance with respect to information classification leaves the release of defense-related information at the discretion of the executive. Second, the MND has reportedly not been forthcoming with information concerning the death of conscripts.⁶⁸

Sources of Progress Toward Supremacy

At least four factors explain the progress that Taiwan has made towards establishing civilian supremacy over the military: regime pre-conditions, external threat, political leadership, and democratic institutionalization.

First, one important variable that impacts the likelihood of a successful democratic transition is whether the autocratic regime was dominated by military or civilian elites. The Taiwan case provides further evidence for Aguero's hypothesis that "civilianized autocracies" are more likely to lead peaceful transitions in terms of civil-military relations.⁶⁹ In the decade prior to democratic transition and consolidation, military representatives accounted for only 10 percent of the KMT Central Standing Committee, which suggests that the regime would be classified as largely civilianized. While the military remained a key actor in domestic politics, leadership of the transition lay in civilian hands, especially of Chiang Ching-kuo and the Lee Teng-hui. The twist is that Taiwan also enjoyed a legacy of *party* control of the military through the commissar system. Prior to the democratic transition, the military had already been subjected to four decades of external hierarchical authority from a civilian (but undemocratic) source. Combined with the KMT's leadership of the transition, this legacy of external control no doubt helped decrease overt resistance by the military to a political transition undertaken by the same party. That the transition lay in the hands of the KMT, which presumably posed less of a threat to the military, should not be underestimated.

Second, the presence of a clear and increasing external threat to Taiwan's security during its democratic transition and consolidation facilitated progress towards civilian supremacy. In particular, Taiwan provides further evidence for Desch's argument that states facing an external military threat are more likely to have stable civil-military relations because the threat downplays the role of internal security and creates common ground between military and civilian elites.⁷⁰ In 1989, the tragedy of Tiananmen Square revealed that the leadership in Beijing was prepared to use force against its own people, shattering the illusion of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In 1995, missile tests

and military exercises in response to Lee Teng-hui's U.S. trip confirmed China's growing assertiveness over Taiwan, which included additional missile tests during the 1996 presidential campaign. The drafting of the NDL and implementation of the current Jingshi An, which seeks to create a more efficient force based on high-technology weapons platforms, began only in 1997, after the threat from China came into sharp focus. As a result, momentum towards reform of the military has combined democratic concerns of accountability with a practical interest in maximizing Taiwan's security vis-à-vis China.⁷¹ Indeed, in addition to cementing democratic control of the armed forces, the DMOL aims to increase the combat effectiveness of joint operations by centralizing the three services into one command and thus reduce intraservice rivalry. Corruption charges from procurement scandals and unclear lines of command authority have been equally effective reasons for reforming civil-military relations as the desire to end the autonomy of the command system.

Third, effective civilian leadership before, during, and after the transition to democracy has contributed greatly to the progress towards civilian supremacy. Chiang Ching-kuo set the stage for a successful transition by limiting involvement by the armed forces in domestic politics before the start of the transition. In 1986, Chiang stated in an interview that after his death "there would be no military rule whatever,"⁷² which decreased the ability of an officer to seize power in the name of the former president. Chiang also chose to initiate the transition by first removing the military from its internal security role through the lifting of martial law, which began the process of political neutralization before substantial political change had occurred and established space for opposition parties in the political system. Finally, in contrast to adherence to the rotation system for officers, Chiang extended Hau Pei-sun's tenure as Chief of the General Staff (CGS), which allowed the latter to build a power base within the armed forces. Some analysts believe that this helped create cleavages within the military that prevented unity during the remainder of the transition and allowed Lee to build his own base of support within the military among those who were opposed to Hau.⁷³

Lee Teng-hui's management of civil-military relations played a critical role throughout the transition and consolidation of Taiwan's democracy. First, recognizing the political importance of the armed forces, Lee accommodated military interests by deferring consideration of serious reform until his authority had been consolidated. In 1988, after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee extended Hau Pei-tsun's term

as CGS to an unprecedented eight years in order to ensure continued military support of his presidency. In 1990, in return for Hau's support of Lee's troubled election as president, Lee appointed Hau as premier only months after Hau had become defense minister. From 1988 to 1992, little direct progress was made with respect to the establishment of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. During this time, the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) remained in force, the military command system remained autonomous, and active duty officers still served on the KMT's Central Standing Committee (CSC). Indeed, none of the serious reforms of civil-military relations were implemented until after 1996, when President Lee Teng-hui was elected for second term and Taiwan's new democracy began to consolidate.

Second, Lee limited future military influence on domestic politics using democratic means to limit the influence of Hau, the former general who had served as the head of the conservative faction in the KMT. When Hau became premier, he resigned from the military and surrendered his commission, which prevented him from legally returning to the armed forces. Moreover, by nominating him as premier, Lee handed Hau a full plate of nonmilitary related duties to fulfill, limiting the amount of time Hau could spend on the armed forces. In early 1993, in response to the poor showing by the KMT in the 1992 elections, Lee compelled the cabinet to resign, thereby removing Hau from the civilian administration and active political life.⁷⁴ Thus what looked like undue military influence in politics through the appointment of Hau in 1990 enabled Lee to remove him later, not just from the military but also from an active role in politics: Hau then lacked an official position in the civilian government, but could not return to active duty in the armed forces. In 1995, when Hau was a presidential candidate, support for his candidacy was limited and he withdrew from the race.

Third, Lee exploited factions within the armed forces to build his own base of support. In the early 1990s, Lee began to appoint those generals from the navy and air force to senior positions who had been opposed to Hau's "big-army" doctrine, which had emphasized a large standing army.⁷⁵ The movement towards strictly defensive operations conducted jointly by the three services further downplayed the influence of the army.

The fourth and final factor is the emergence of democratic institutions that supported Lee's subsequent efforts to increase civilian supremacy. Key institutions included the presence of a vocal opposition within the Legislative Yuan (LY), a free press, and an active judiciary. In the early 1990s, for example, Chen Shui-bian made reform of the

military one of his key issues while serving as a legislator, publishing a book in 1993 entitled *The Black Box of Defense*. Reform of the military was also actively discussed in the 1995 legislative elections and has been the subject of frequent editorials in the opposition press, especially the *Zili Wanbao*. The LY also played a key role in the drafting and passage of the NDL and DMOL, which gain bipartisan support from the KMT and DPP. The demotion of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) to a minor office in the MND stemmed from a DPP legislator's suggestion.⁷⁶ In part, opposition to aspects of the military, channeled through public opinion, has compelled the government to act when it otherwise might not. The transfer of the Procurement Bureau to the MND prior to the passage of the DMOL reflected a response by the government to pressure from the public and legislators in the wake of several scandals. Likewise, the MND's establishment of a special investigative committee resulted from public pressure.

The judiciary also played a key role. Rulings by the Council of Grand Justice compelled the CGS to appear before the LY. In July 1998, however, the Council of Grand Justices ruled that the CGS "cannot deny" a legislator's request to appear before the LY.⁷⁷ As a result, on 30 September 1998, Tang Fei appeared before the National Defense Committee, which marked the first interpellation of a CGS before the LY.⁷⁸ The judiciary also issued rulings that limited the role and influence of the military in the national education system, especially universities.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article has demonstrated that Taiwan since 1986 has achieved substantial progress towards civilian supremacy across all three dimensions. The military has become largely a neutral political force, and withdrawn from most aspects of government administration apart from elements of the defense bureaucracy. In particular, its internal security function has been eliminated. Likewise, the passage of the National Defense Law in 2000 created the legal basis for democratic control, placing the previously autonomous command system directly under the Ministry of National Defense. A more activist legislature has bolstered democratic control through increased supervision of the military. Reconciliation efforts for past abuses by the armed forces and the elimination of mandatory military education programs have increased social impartiality.

This progress towards civilian supremacy was indeed a necessary condition for both a successful transition and continuing consolidation

of the island's new democracy. Overt military opposition during the early years of the transition probably would have stalled or greatly limited the initial movement towards democracy, as the armed forces then played a key role in internal security. Only after the consolidation of Taiwan's democracy in 1996 was the civilian government able to pursue reforms to entrench political neutrality and democratic control of the armed forces.

The Taiwan case of civil-military relations under democratization carries important and more general implications. First, Taiwan's experience underscores the importance of skilled political leadership and the timing of reforms, which is remarkable in part because many of the most important reforms were deferred for five or ten years after the transition's start without actually damaging the transition as a whole. In the case of democratic control, the NDLC and DMOL were not passed by the legislature until thirteen years after the lifting of martial law. By deferring the reforms that most squarely address the interests of the military, Lee ensured that both the transition to democracy and the reform of civil-military relations would succeed.

Second, Taiwan provides a clear roadmap for the transformation of civil-military relations in mainland China. The pretransition similarities between China and Taiwan are striking, as both militaries served Leninist political parties and are penetrated at all levels by a political commissar system. When the mainland does begin its transition to democracy, the example of Taiwan's reforms will be available to China's leaders as a point of reference. It also suggests that civil-military relations may not be the largest obstacle to the democratization of the mainland.

Notes

AUTHOR'S NOTE: *The author thanks Michel Oksenberg, Larry Diamond, Monte Bullard, Ken Allen, Martin Dimitrov, and Jeffrey Wu, along with two anonymous reviewers, for helpful comments and suggestions. Apart from proper names, which appear in Wade Giles, I have used the pinyin system of romanization for Chinese words.*

1. On the importance of the lifting of martial law in Taiwan's democratization, see Yun-han Chu, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992); Shelly Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1999); Hung-mao Tien, *The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1989). Writing in 1991, Copper states that "martial law had been, according to virtually all opposition politicians and activists in Taiwan for years, the major obstacle to a genuine opposition, free elections and democracy." Furthermore, he states that the lifting of martial law "was a turning point." See John F. Copper, "Opposition

Politics in Taiwan,” in *The Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949-1988*, ed. Cecilia S. Chang (New York: Institute of Asian Studies, St. John’s University, 1991), 76-77. Writing in 2001, Chu and Lin state that the lifting of martial law and removing the ban on opposition parties “were a watershed in Taiwan’s regime transition. They essentially pushed the process of authoritarian breakdown over the point of no return.” See Yu-han Chu and Jih-Wen Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity,” *The China Quarterly* 165 (2001): 121.

2. See, for example, Tien, *The Great Transition*; Lynda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Steven J. Hood, *The Kuomintang and Taiwan’s Democratization* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); Chu, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan*; Alan Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy*.
3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).
4. For a clear articulation of civilian supremacy, see Felipe Aguero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). Also, see Felipe Aguero, “Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America,” in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Larry J. Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Wendy Hunter, “Contradictions of Civilian Control: Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1990s,” *Third World Quarterly* 15, 4 (1994); Elizabeth P. Coughlan, “Democratizing Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces & Society* 24, 3 (1998).
5. Hsiao-shih Cheng, *Party-Army Relations in the PRC and Taiwan* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
6. Teh-fu Huang, “Elections and the Evolution of the KMT in Taiwan’s Electoral Process,” in *Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition*, ed. Hung-mao Tien (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1996), 118-120.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Far Eastern Economic Review [FEER]*, 2 June 1983.
9. In 1983, however, Chiang appointed Wang Sheng as Ambassador to Paraguay, removing him from domestic politics. The precise role of Wang Sheng and Liu-Shao-Kang remains a subject of controversy. While contemporary news reports characterize it as an alternative seat of power, research based on extensive interviews with Wang Sheng indicate that the office did not assume this role, but rather served as an in-house think-tank for the president and the KMT. But from the perspective of civil-military relations, the prominent role of any officer in such a body would still indicate the absence of neutrality. See Thomas A. Marks, *Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang* (London: Frank Cass, 1996).

10. *China News*, 17 September 1998; *FEER*, 13 August 1982; Chu, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan*, 21.
11. The Executive Yuan (EY) is the executive branch of Taiwan's government, which is led by the premier, who is in turn appointed by the president. The Legislative Yuan (LY) is the legislative branch of Taiwan's government, with a unicameral system.
12. *FEER*, 23 November 1995; Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan's Transformation," in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Perspectives*, ed. Larry Diamond (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 139-140.
13. For details on the commissar system in Taiwan, see Cheng, *Party-Army Relations*; Monte Bullard, *The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan's Development* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).
14. *FEER*, 18 May 1989
15. *Er er ba shijian yanjiu baogao* [Research Report on the 2-28 Incident], Xingzhengyuan yanjiu er er ba shijian xiaoxu [Executive Yuan Research Small Group for the 2-28 Incident], Taipei, 1992. The report discusses scholarly estimates, which range from 10,000 to 28,000.
16. *Taipei Times*, 10 September 1999; *Free China Journal*, 5 June 1998.
17. Bullard, *The Soldier and the Citizen*. One positive legacy of this effort, Bullard notes, was state-building, which was largely absent in Taiwan.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Aguero, "Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America," 178.
20. For a discussion of political neutrality, see Aguero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy*; Diamond, *Developing Democracy*.
21. *FEER*, 23 November 1989; *FEER*, 28 January 1988; *FEER*, 8 May 1986.
22. Chao and Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy*, 271. After resigning from the premiership, Hau reiterated this perspective, believed to characterize the view of many in the senior officer corps. In a 1994 interview, he stated "if any political party becomes the ruling party and invalidates the name of the ROC terminating the ROC, I do not think that the army will agree to go along with this. The army's responsibility is to protect the ROC. If there is a political party which is not loyal to the ROC, I do not think that the army will sit by and watch." Quoted in Wachman, *Taiwan*, 157.
23. Tang Fei reportedly stated that "the army supports the ROC and the name of the country is the ROC, not Taiwan...if some day the name of the country is changed according to the Constitution into Taiwan, we will safeguard Taiwan." See Chih-cheng Lo, "Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges," in *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Role of the Military in Asia*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 151.
24. *Central News Agency*, 5 January 1998
25. Reuters Wire Service, 18 March 2000; *Taiwan News*, 18 January 2000.

26. In part, the reliance upon active officers represents the lack of civilian experts qualified to assume these positions. Given the imminent national security threat posed by China, reliance on all available skilled personnel is understandable and mitigates the negative impact on consolidation.
27. *China News*, 27 January 1999; *Zili Wanbao*, 10 July 1994; *CNA*, 23 January 1999. Yin was previously the head of the NSB, while Ting Yu-chou was former director of Military Intelligence.
28. Individuals appointed to this position include: General Huang Hsien-yung (June 1998), Lt-Gen Huang Ching-Ying (June 1998), General Wang Wen-Hsieh (January 1999), and General Hsia Ying-chou (January 1999). While it is unclear whether these appointments are honorary or substantive, they are somewhat unusual. One conjecture is that they represent a tactic by Lee Teng-hui to keep former generals under a tight reign by appointing them to a high office within the EY and away from their former bases of power.
29. Hsiao-shih Cheng, "Woguo Zhengjun Guanxi De Bianqian Chushi [Changing Trends in Our Country's Government-Military Relations]," in *Jundui Yu Shehui [The Military and Society]*, ed. Chin-chiang Su (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1997), 89. There were reports that there were 30 individuals who voiced the views of the military at this congress. See Chin-chiang Su, "Guojun Yu Shehui Guanxi Zhi Jiangou [Establishment of Relations between the National Military and Society]," in *Jundui Yu Shehui [The Military and Society]*, ed. Chin-chiang Su (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1997), 8.
30. John F. Copper, *The KMT's 15th Party Congress: Ruling Party at a Cross-Roads* (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1997).
31. *South China Morning Post*, 9 November 1994.
32. *China News*, 18 October 1997.
33. *Taiwan News*, 18 January 2000.
34. *Zhongyang Ribao (Central Daily)*, 1997.
35. Ministry of National Defense, *National Defense Report* (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise, 1998), 55.
36. Ministry of National Defense, *National Defense Report* (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise, 2000).
37. Quoted in Su, "Guojun Yu Shehui Guanxi Zhi Jiangou," 8. See Cheng, "Woguo Zhengjun Guanxi," 89.
38. Lo, "Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges," 151.
39. The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion were added to the constitution in May 1948. The provisions enhanced presidential power during the emergency of the communist uprising, which granted a series of extraconstitutional powers and removed the two-term limit. The abolition of the provisions thus revived the democratic components of the ROC constitution, including the original provisions for civil-military relations.

40. Cheng, "Woguo Zhengjun Guanxi."
41. "Welcome to the 1990s," *Asiaweek*, 3 April 1998; Ministry of National Defense, *National Defense Report*.
42. *Taipei Times*, 12 November 1999.
43. Michael D. Swaine, *Taiwan's National Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons Procurement Processes* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999).
44. *Ibid.*, 36-43.
45. The effects of this arrangement were not limited to civilian supremacy. Due to the structure of Taiwan's armed forces, budgeting and procurement could be heavily influenced by interservice rivalries, depending on the CGS. Swaine argues that this structure has led to a suboptimal military policy vis-à-vis the threat from China, as crucial joint-service operations would be downplayed.
46. *Zhongguo Shibao [China Times]*, 22 January 2000; *Zhongguo Shibao [China Times]*, 17 January 2000.
47. For more on the drafting, see Arthur Shu-fan Ding and Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, "Taiwan's Military in the 21st Century: Redefinition and Reorganization," in *The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century*, ed. Larry Woertzel (Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999); Swaine, *Taiwan's National Security*.
48. Chen-ya Hu, "The National Defense Law and the Adjustment of the Ministry of National Defense," *Peace Forum Essays* (2000).
49. *China News*, 24 March 1998; *China News*, 21 March 1998.
50. For detailed discussion, see Jin-peng Peng, "Guofangbu Yu Guohui Goutong Zhidu [The Communications System between the Ministry of National Defense and Legislative Yuan]," in *Jundui Yu Shehui [The Military and Society]*, ed. Chin-chiang Su (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1997).
51. The LY lacks a constitutional channel for supervising the work of the NSB. The NSB is not currently part of the EY, but reports directly to the president and is supervised by the NSC.
52. *Zili Wanbao*, 29 March 1999.
53. Su, "Guojun Yu Shehui Guanxi Zhi Jiangou," 9-11. In 1998, for example, the DDP put forth a resolution to discuss whether then defense minister Chiang Chung-lin should resign in the aftermath of a string of military air crashes, which failed to pass by only three votes. Despite its failure, this event reflects the openness within the legislature to discuss issues related to the military system. See *China News*, 4 April 1998.
54. Swaine, *Taiwan's National Security*, 38; *Zhongguo Shibao [China Times]*, 22 January 2000; *Zhongguo Shibao [China Times]*, 17 January 2000.
55. Ministry of National Defense, *National Defense Report*, 133.
56. For a detailed discussion of issues surrounding the classification of defense information, see Lo, "Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges," 148-149. For example, during

his 1998 interpellation, Tang Fei stated "if lawmakers can keep mum on classified military secrets, I'll give more detailed reports." Quoted in *China News*, 1 October 1998.

57. Interview with a former legislative aid to a DPP legislator.
58. Interview with former legislative aid to a DPP legislator.
59. Chin-chiang Su and Guo-xiong Chen, "Looking at National Defense Policy from the National Defense Budget" (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1999).
60. Huang, "Elections and the Evolution of the KMT in Taiwan's Electoral Process," 4.
61. *China News*, 17 September 1998; *Taipei Times*, 14 December 1999.
62. Interviews.
63. *Asiaweek*, 3 April 1998; *China News*, 4 May 1998; *China News*, 23 August 1997.
64. Council of Grand Justices, Interpretation 450, 27 March 1998. See also, Defen He, "Junxun Jiaoyu Zong Tujian [Comprehensive Examination of the Military Training and Education]," in *Jundui Yu Shehui [The Military and Society]*, ed. Chin-chiang Su (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1997).
65. Su, "Guojun Yu Shehui Guanxi Zhi Jiangou," 24.
66. *China News*, 27 June 1999.
67. *China News*, 23 August 1997.
68. Aguero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy*.
69. Michael Desch, "Threat Environments and Military Missions," in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 14.
70. For example, one of the key problems highlighted by Cheng with the dual command system is the unclear line of authority that can damage military effectiveness. See Cheng, "Woguo Zhengjun Guanxi," 93-94.
71. Quoted in Brian G. Martin, "Relationship between the Kuomintang and the Military in Taiwan," in *Modern Taiwan in the 1990s*, ed. Gary Klintworth (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991), 30.
72. Chu, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan*, 21.
73. *Zhongguo Shibao [China Times]*, 17 January 2000.
74. Council of Grand Justices, Interpretation 461, 24 July 1998.
75. *China News*, 1 October 1998.